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In my first chapter, I estimate a dynamic model of hospital investments in neonatal
intensive care in Texas. Since the early 1990s, investment in this service has been quite
robust. Urban areas have multiple hospitals that offer high level facilities but generally
operate below capacity. Quality in neonatal intensive care increases with the number of pa-
tients treated: higher patient volumes lead to lower mortality rates. The entry of additional
neonatal intensive care units imposes a negative production externality on existing units by
reducing patient volumes. I estimate a static model of patient demand to determine how
patient choices respond to investment. Through the dynamic model I recover the hospitals’
costs for treating different types of patients. I estimate a model of volume-outcome effects
to predict how patient flows affect aggregate mortality. I simulate counterfactual outcomes
under several restricted-entry regimes and find that up to 20% of the deaths of very low birth
weight infants would be prevented in Texas by restricting entry of new neonatal intensive
care units.
In my second chapter, I study an economy of scale in the production of quality and the
consequences for consumer welfare in the context of neonatal intensive care in Texas. Using
vii
detailed birth-certificate-level data including ID of the hospital of birth covering all NICU
patients over eight years, I identify the causal effect of prior patient volume on the probability
of mortality for new patients. I also empirically estimate a forgetting rate, capturing the
rate at which the stock of accumulated experience declines in importance to the production
of lower mortality. I find a very high rate of forgetting in this setting, suggesting that entry
into this market may be quite harmful. I find that moving patients from low to high volume
NICU’s within each county in the state would lead to substantial savings in lives: on the
order of 145 infants annually. Valuing these lives at $7,000,000 each results in a welfare
improvement of $1,000,000,000. I propose some policy options for the regulator in light of
my results, including direct regulation of hospital prices to minimize the welfare loss from
monopoly pricing.
In my third chapter, I look at the consequences of entry in NICU markets for a wide
variety of outcomes using national data.
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Chapter 1
Inefficient Technology Investment: Competition,
Mortality and Neonatal Intensive Care
1.1 Introduction
The setting I study is the market for neonatal intensive care for very low birth weight
infants (< 1500 g.) in Texas. The very low birth weight (VLBW) population is of substantial
interest due to its outsized contribution to overall infant mortality. These infants make up
only 1.5% of all births, but represent more than 50% of all infant deaths in the US annually
(see Tables (1.3) and (1.4)). Lowering the mortality rate for this population has the potential
to result in substantial welfare improvements from modest reductions in the mortality rate.
Very low birth weight infants are treated at birth in specialized neonatal intensive care units
(NICUs). A large body of evidence on neonatal intensive care units suggests that mortality
risk for VLBW infants is much lower when they are treated in higher-volume NICUs (e.g.,
[88]). The leading explanation for this effect is that there is learning by doing at the hospital
level: hospital personnel learn to do better by doing more.
More broadly, healthcare services are an important setting characterized by increasing
returns to scale in quality. Though the causal effects are difficult to identify, substantial
evidence suggests that learning by doing in patient volume (and its converse, organizational
forgetting) leads to economically meaningful differences in outcome quality across providers.
1
These effects require a different regulatory approach than that appropriate to a standard
differentiated products oligopoly. In particular, entry of new NICUs may reduce total welfare
by reducing average quality across all firms, while mergers may be welfare improving by
improving quality.
Since the volume of very low birth weight patients is roughly fixed from year to year,
entry into this market may be harmful: average patient volumes may be lowered across all
hospitals, raising mortality risk. Conditional on a set of doctors and medical technologies,
there do not appear to be any good substitutes for treating actual patients in learning how to
produce better outcomes. Moreover, as I show in related work, high recent patient volume
matters more than volume in the distant past. In this paper, I study the relationships
among patient volume and quality of outcome (taking seriously the potential endogeneity of
volume), model the incentives for firms to enter a market, and examine the consequences for
aggregate welfare in Texas. The goal of this paper is to weigh the costs of entry against its
benefits and to judge whether entry restrictions into the NICU market are warranted.
Hospitals in Texas have invested aggressively in NICUs since the cessation of entry
restrictions in the mid 1980’s (see Figures (1.8) and (1.10)). I show that these investments
are not driven by capacity constraints at existing facilities using birth-certificate data on
admissions to Texas NICUs. Rather, the primary motivation is business stealing from com-
petitors. Investment is driven by the substantial increase in the total volume of patients
admitted to the obstetrics ward which occurs after opening a NICU. Furthermore, this vol-
ume is far larger than what can be accounted for by the population plausibly in need of
intensive care.
The problem of entry into markets characterized by economies of scale in the produc-
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tion of quality is a broad one. Such markets face a set of antitrust and regulatory concerns
which are the mirror image of those in markets economies of scale in quality. In standard
differentiated product settings without these scale economies, entry is generally beneficial
and mergers are potentially harmful. Entry results in increased supply, lower prices and more
convenient access to a product. Entry restrictions are welfare-reducing. Mergers increase
market power and can raise prices, also reducing total welfare. On the other hand, entry in
markets with economies of scale in quality may decrease average customer volume at all firms
and lower average product quality, despite also lowering prices. Mergers in these markets
can generate additional efficiencies beyond cost reductions by increasing consumer volumes
and improving average quality, despite potentially increasing market power. The welfare
gain from these effects can be larger than the loss due to higher pricing. A regulator failing
to consider factors unique to markets with economies of scale in quality will get the sign of
the welfare changes of entry or a merger wrong. Healthcare markets are an economically
important setting characterized by increasing returns to quality in patient volume ([45] and
[44]).
A large existing literature in health services research suggests that high patient vol-
umes lead to better-quality outcomes. Though achieving credible identification is difficult,
there is good reason to believe that higher-volume facilities produce better quality outcomes
for patients as the result of learning by doing. In contrast to typical experience goods mar-
kets, in health care ‘low quality’ service can involve an appreciably higher risk of extremely
serious outcomes, including mortality. Therefore, there is a significant tension between the
benefits of price reductions vs. the costs of lower quality associated with market entry, and
the costs of higher prices vs. the benefits of higher quality in mergers. While there are mod-
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els of learning by doing and its effects on market concentration in the theoretical literature
(including [6], [20], [23], and [34]) the papers do not consider the consequences for entry.
A credible study of the effects of regulatory interventions in this environment requires
that I estimate a model with three components: (1.) a demand model for hospital services,
(2.) a model of hospital investment incentives and (3.) a model of how patient volumes
at the NICU affect patient mortality rates. To estimate the demand model, I use inpatient
discharge data covering nearly all patients and hospitals in the state to estimate demand for
hospitals as a function of hospital and patient characteristics. To understand firm incentives,
I estimate a structural model of firm investment in this service, in which I recover firms’
revenues and costs of treating patients in different severity groups, as well as the fixed costs
of investing in neonatal intensive care. Estimates of these cost parameters are not available
from other sources and are essential to the computation of counterfactuals. To estimate
the relationship between patient volume and mortality I use birth-certificate level data for
every patient admitted to a Texas NICU over eight years. Existing work in this literature
typically does not control for the potential endogeneity of volume. I instrument for volume
and show that the effects of volume on reducing the mortality rate are positive, causal and
of meaningful magnitude.
I combine the three models to conduct two principal counterfactuals. In the first, I
suppose that a social planner has the authority to designate which hospitals are permitted to
open neonatal intensive care units. This corresponds to the kind of strict Certificate of Need
regulation which already exists in many states. As a second counterfactual, I permit firms
to invest freely, but allow the regulator to charge a fee for investment which increases in the
number of firms servicing the market. This forces the firms to internalize some of the negative
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externality their entry imposes. In both cases, I find that these regulatory changes can result
in less investment in each market, which concentrates volume and reduces mortality.
My counterfactuals show that hospitals do benefit from their investment: despite po-
tentially treating a higher-cost patient population, the gains in revenue from general patient
volume are large. Despite this, the overall mortality rate in a market increases as volumes
decline everywhere. I show that centralizing the provision of these services would reduce the
total mortality in this population in Texas annually by 20%. Entry restrictions are bene-
ficial in this market. Similarly, a relaxed regulatory attitude towards hospital mergers can
permit quality improvements via patient volume increases. I propose several ways the reg-
ulator could achieve this result, including consolidating existing facilities ([80]) or imposing
minimum volume requirements.
A regulator examining markets characterized by all of these features needs to consider
price effects, volume effects and the attendant effects on product quality and the fixed
costs of investment jointly in computing welfare changes. If the regulator decides that
the positive effects of high volume at a monopoly provider outweigh the negative effects of
monopoly prices, entry restrictions are warranted. The regulator has an additional set of
tools at his disposal to protect consumers from higher prices: direct regulation of prices.
This ensures that the welfare loss due to monopoly pricing is not too large, but permits
the monopolist to leverage the positive effects of volume. This will be welfare-improving
compared to encouraging entry and competition.
Many states have an existing legal framework in place to implement entry restrictions
in the form of “Certificate of Need” (CON) laws. These restrictions require that existing
hospitals trying to enter a new service area, or entirely new hospitals trying to enter a market,
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prove that there is unmet demand for the services they would offer. Though these laws were
not initially conceived with volume effects in mind, they provide an easy way for regulators
to restrict entry. Additionally, there are informative examples outside of the US in which
hospitals have have been closed to consolidate services among fewer providers. Better patient
outcomes have been realized in these cases (e.g., [80] for perinatal care in Portugal, and [77]
for stroke care in Manchester and London, England).
I can compute for each market what prices would have to be for hospitals to capture
all of the potential welfare gained by increasing patient volumes and reducing mortality rates.
I find that prices would have to be extraordinarily high for hospitals to appropriate all of
this surplus. Finally, an additional potential disadvantage to entry restrictions comes in the
form of increased travel times to receive services from more distantly-located patients. I can
compute the implied per-mile cost that would be required to make the total welfare change
neutral or negative in the service centralization case. I find implausibly large costs per mile
are necessary. My conclusion is that the benefits of increased access through higher facility
numbers are outweighed by the costs of higher mortality associated with reduced patient
volumes.
1.2 Previous Literature
Studies of volume effects on the quality of outcomes are numerous in the public health
literature. There are surveys in [76], [59], [69], and [83] among many others. The question
has been extensively studied, starting as early as 100 years ago.1 Results found in these
1See citation 1 in [76]
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numerous studies suggest that hospital volume affects quality of care across procedures.
Effect sizes vary, and achieving credible identification is difficult, but the relationship is
positive: higher quantity leads to better outcomes. In light of this, there are programs
aimed at centralizing some forms of critical care in the US and elsewhere. Empirical work
on the effects of such regionalization programs also confirms that centralizing treatment can
have a substantial positive effect on outcomes. [77] study the effect of regionalizing stroke
care in London, which show substantial reductions in mortality from decreasing the number
of hospitals offering stroke care in the greater London area. The prior literature on this effect
in the context of neonatal intensive care is extensive: see [88], [28], [60], [65] or [80].
There is a connection between the model proposed here and the “medical arms race”
(MAR) literature (see [37]). That literature proposed that hospitals would over-invest in
technology in order to attract physicians and their patients. This is a form of competition
on quality, rather than price, as hospitals vertically differentiate themselves by offering the
most advanced facilities to the physicians in their market. (The “arms race” describes the
idea that consumers do not benefit from this form of competition.) Costs to insurers and
consumers increase to cover the costs of hospitals’ over-investing. Empirical evidence on this
hypothesis is mixed (see [38], [37], [47]). My project is related to that literature in that
I attempt to assess how the profitability per-patient changes with the number of hospitals
in the market, but I add and measure the possibility of welfare loss through lower-quality
service.
An important feature of this market is that improvements in patient mortality are
driven by facility-level learning. This is not a one-way process: when patients are not seen,
accumulated knowledge depreciates. Learning by doing is the subject of a large literature,
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including studies which estimate rates of forgetting. Implied monthly rates of forgetting are
generally quite high. Forgetting is on the order of 3% - 5%: see [17], [110], [107] and [108].
Learning by doing models and related work are surveyed in [109]. Work in this literature
in the context of health care includes [98], [45], [44]. [64] estimate a surgeon-specific human
capital depreciation rate in coronary artery bypass graft procedures in Pennsylvania and find
that each day away from surgeries increases patient mortality risk by 0.07 percentage points.
Other related work includes studies of hospital competition on quality ([68], [46], [31],
[57]), the effects of investment in neonatal intensive care units on outcomes ([42, 88], [13]),
studies of the effects of the volume of medical procedures on the quality of outcomes ([63],
[54], [92]) and structural models of firm investment, including [29] and [95]. There are also
several dynamic structural models of hospital behavior, including [56], [97] and [?].
My paper builds on their earlier work along several dimensions. Like [97], but unlike
[56], the investment process I model corresponds to something directly observable in the
data. In contrast to [97], I observe all of the patients in the Texas market, so I can compute
demand directly from that data. More importantly, there is an explicit welfare dimension to
my paper via the tension between positive volume effects and the increased convenience of
access arising from decentralization. Finally, there is a connection between this paper and
an earlier theoretical literature on entry restrictions in homogeneous goods markets [73], in
which free entry resulted in excessive entry, studied empirically in radio markets by [19] and
[18].
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1.3 Industry Overview
1.3.1 NICUs
Neonatal intensive care has its origins in the birth of the infant incubator in France
in the late 19th century ([11]). The technology was brought to the United States in the early
20th century and spread slowly due to skepticism within the medical profession. Interestingly,
the very first specialized facilities to care for these infants in the United States were not
hospitals but amusement park attractions ([11], [21], [84], [90]). Prior to the existence of
NICU’s, hospitals left the very premature to the care of their parents, since there was nothing
that could be done to improve the outcomes for them medically ([11]). Most would die soon
after leaving the hospital.
In the 1960’s, formal perinatal regionalization programs began to coordinate care
and patient transfers among hospitals with and without intensive care units for premature
infants ([7]). One of the most transformative technological developments of the 1990’s for
very low birth weight infants was the introduction of surfactants, which aid breathing in
underdeveloped lungs. Substantial improvements in outcomes for this set of infants were
achieved between the 1950’s and 1990’s, though progress may have stalled ([66]). A sub-
stantial fraction of the overall improvement in infant mortality in the United States over the
past half century can be credited to changes in the outcome for the very low birth weight
population.
Most infants are admitted to the NICU due to prematurity (<37 weeks). In 2012,
9.8% (roughly 385,000) of all infants born in the United States were premature ([115]). 8%
were low or very-low birth weight ([115]) - that rate is about 1% higher in Texas. Neonatal
intensive care units are differentiated by levels (numbered 1-3) depending on the quality
9
of service provided. This classification scheme is used throughout the United States.2 The
lowest level designation (Level I) covers general labor and delivery services which are available
in any hospital that handles labor and delivery. Should an infant needing intensive care be
born in a hospital with a Level I facility, that facility must have the ability to stabilize and
transfer the patient to a higher level NICU ([4]). Level II facilities (neonatal intermediate
care) generally provide more advanced care (excluding surgery) for sick infants, except those
weighing less than 1500 grams (i.e., those who are VLBW) and do not provide long-term
mechanical ventilation. Such a facility should be able to care for infants born at more
than 32 weeks gestation. Level III facilities (neonatal intensive care) provide mechanical
ventilation of unlimited duration, surgery, and the full range of specialized services available
to neonates. Importantly, the definitions of Levels I, II and III have remained constant in
the Texas Annual Survey of Hospitals between 1990 and 2012, the period I study.
1.3.2 NICU Investment
Hospitals in Texas have invested aggressively in building new NICU’s since the early
1990’s. Figures (1.8) and (1.10) show the total number of hospitals in the state, and each
bar has been split into three categories, tracking the number of facilities at Levels I, II and
III over time. Most of the new facilities entered counties which had at least one existing
NICU (see Figures (1.13) and (1.14)), and thus are not expanding access to geographically
unserved areas. Specializing to hospitals in populous counties (here defined to be those with
more than 250,000 inhabitants), Figure (1.10) shows that the number of hospitals offering
2Starting in 2018, Texas will introduce a classification scheme including a Level 4 facility, but that does
not affect the time period I study, which ends in 2012.
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only Level I services drops from about half in 1990 to perhaps one quarter by 2012, while
more than half upgrade to Level III services by the end of the time period. Competitive
pressure among hospitals in urban areas drives the investment. These effects are not driven
by capacity constraints at existing NICUs, as I show in the next paragraph.
Using birth certificate data containing information about the hospital of birth, I can
compute several measures of utilized capacity in NICU’s. I do not observe the date of
admission and discharge, so I cannot compute durations of stay for any patient. I compute
several indirect measures of capacity utilization instead. First, I compare the total number
of admissions to the NICU for the whole month to the number of beds in the NICU, which
I take from the hospital survey. The results are in Table (1.5) in the second column. Only a
third of hospital-month observations see more patients admitted to the NICU for the whole
month than there are beds in the facility. Second, I use the average duration of stay in
a NICU (13.2 days) to compute the mean and median free days per bed, assuming that
each patient admitted in the month has a stay of average duration. I find that there are on
average 16-18 free days per bed per month. The median number of free days per bed under
the same assumption is 19-20. These measures suggest that it is very unlikely that existing
facilities are near their capacity constraints.
One driver of investment has been a shift in the underlying demand for NICU services.
This is due to an increase in the number of women over age 30 giving birth in the state. In
Figure (1.2), the rate of admission of infants to the NICU is plotted as a function of the age
of the mother. The rate doubles from 6% to 12% as age increases from 30 to 49.3 In Figure
3The rate for women older than 50 is 35%, which is much higher than the rates plotted, but there are
generally fewer than 100 such births every year in Texas.
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(1.3) the fraction of all births occuring to women above age 30 is plotted. This number
increases from just over 26% in 1990 to nearly 34% in 2010, the last available year for this
data set. This understates the total increase, considering the magnitude of the population
growth in the state between 1990 and 2012. There were 316,000 births in Texas in 1990. In
2010 there were 385,000. 26% of all births in 1990 is around 82,000 births, while 34% of all
births in 2010 is 130,900. While demand conditions were changing due to an increase in the
number of mothers having babies above age 30, the growth of the population reinforced that
trend.
One of the most compelling reasons for hospitals to invest in new NICU facilities,
however, is that a hospital without a high level NICU may lose business to one which does
have one. Most women will not know in advance of the onset of labor whether they will need
NICU services. Because the consequences of not having high-level NICU services available
if they are necessary can be severe, a precautionary motive may cause mothers to plan their
labor and delivery for a hospital with those services. This is visible in data from Texas in
figure (1.7). The mean number of total births at a hospital in the two years prior to the
construction of an NICU grows only slightly, but by the end of the second year after the
construction of a NICU, total birth numbers have increased by about one third. Given that
the number of infants who need Level III services is about 13% of all births, it is unlikely that
this increase is driven solely by the provision of high-level NICU services. A large number
of women will choose to use the hospital but will not end up needing those services.
Evidence from Medicaid reimbursement rates in Texas suggests that while uncom-
plicated deliveries might yield a $1200 reimbursement to the hospital, providing the most
high-level services to very sick neonates can be reimbursed at rates up to $100,000 ([105],
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[106]). While NICU services are more expensive for providers, observed investment suggests
again that hospitals are unlikely to lose substantial sums by opening NICU’s. In fact, the
reverse is likely true. Reimbursement amounts by private insurance companies are unlikely
to be lower than those for Medicaid, so the above figures are a lower bound on the true reim-
bursements. Investment in NICU services is driven by the opportunity to provide lucrative,
highly-reimbursed services to a subset of the patient population, but also by the fact that
entirely new patients are drawn to the hospital.
1.3.3 Certificate of Need Regulation
Certificate of Need regulations are relevant to this paper to the extent that they
give states a way to prevent both entry into new service markets by existing hospitals and
entry of entirely new hospitals. Certificate of Need programs were originally motivated by
concerns that hospitals would over-invest to attract doctors with advanced facilities, become
highly indebted, and not have enough patient revenue to cover their costs ([96]). States were
eventually compelled to adopt this regulation ([79]). Certificate of Need laws were in force
in 49 states by 1979 ([96]) then began to be repealed in the mid to late 1980’s, including in
Texas. A majority of states currently retain some kind of CON regulation ([78] and Figure
(1.4)). CON permission to offer certain services provides something of value to hospitals,
most likely via market power, because the certificates themselves are valuable assets which
can be sold during bankruptcy proceedings as has happened at least twice in Florida ([101],
and [114]). While CON regulations were not implemented with volume effects in mind, they
provide a simple way for states to restrict investment with an existing legal infrastructure.
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City
Total
NICU Admits
at Birth
Total
Level 3
Beds
Bed-Days
Available
Bed Days
Available
Per Admit
Admits to
Reach 90%
Capacity
San Antonio 2271 141 51465 22.6 3508
Houston 5528 371 135415 24.5 9232
Fort Worth 2474 152 55480 22.5 3782
Dallas 3138 365 133225 42.5 9083
Austin 1451 131 47815 32.4 3260
All Large
Counties,
> 250,000 21159 1621 591665 27.9 40,340
Table 1.1: NICU Capacity in Large Texas Counties
County Total Births Total LBW Total VLBW % LBW % VLBW
Travis Mean 21055 1745 349 8.3 1.6
St. Dev. 1000 35.6 21 0.29 0.13
Bexar Mean 30274 2959 525 9.9 1.7
St. Dev. 749.5 92 32.5 0.18 0.08
Harris Mean 74916 6857 1324 9.15 1.8
St. Dev. 2728 333.6 68 0.15 0.06
Texas Mean 404,259 34,264 5915 8.4 1.45
St. Dev. 9559 998 200 0.05 0.05
Table 1.2: Mean Births, Low Birth Weight Births, Very Low Birth Weight Births in Four
Large Texas Counties, 2005 - 2010
Births LBW VLBW % LBW % VLBW
Average 3,903,012 286,149 53,060 7.3 1.4
St. Dev. 132,283 22,695 3,385 0.32 0.03
Table 1.3: Total US Birth Category Averages, 1995 - 2010
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Infant Deaths LBW VLBW % LBW % VLBW
Average 27,439 18,317 14,400 67 52
St. Dev 1,054 841 725 2.1 1.9
Table 1.4: Average US Infant Deaths Within One Year of Birth by Weight Category, 1995 -
2010
Year
Frac. Months
w/ Admits >
Beds
Mean (SD) Free Days
Per Bed, w/
Stays Avg. Duration Med.
Mean (SD) Free Days
Per Bed, w/
Stays 2 × Avg. Duration Med.
2005 37% 16 (12) 19 3 (25) 9
2006 39% 16 (12) 19 2 (25) 9
2007 40% 16 (12) 19 3 (25) 8
2008 37% 17 (13) 20 5 (26) 10
2009 36% 16 (13) 20 4 (27) 10
2010 36% 17 (13) 20 5 (26) 10
2011 32% 18 (11) 20 7 (23) 11
2012 37% 17 (11) 20 5 (22) 9
Table 1.5: Direct Measurements of NICU Capacity Utilization, Incl. Patients Transferred In
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1.4 Data
I use four main sources of data in this paper. I use the Texas Department of State
Health Statistics (DSHS) Annual Hospital Survey, which tracks hospital investment, as well
as market entry and exit ([104]). I use DSHS’ Inpatient Discharge Public-Use Data File,
which contains data on nearly every inpatient admission in the state, including the complete
set of births at all but a very small number of hospitals. To estimate the volume-outcome
relationship, I have birth-certificate level data from Texas DSHS which contains the name
of the birth hospital. To compute some summary measures of NICU admission, I use the
National Center for Health Statistics Linked Cohort Birth/Death Files.
1.4.1 Data on Hospitals
The Texas Department of State Health Statistics Annual Survey of Hospitals provides
information on hospital services, several measures of utilization and some financial variables
annually between 1990 and 2012. The survey is administered jointly with the better known
Annual Survey of the American Hospital Association. I have linked the surveys across years,
so I can reconstruct a complete picture of all the services offered at the facility level for the
entire study period. I observe all possible transitions among levels in the data, including
upgrades and downgrades.
All hospitals in the state, except for a small collection of facilities in rural counties
and a few specialty hospitals primarily serving children, must complete the report. The
children’s hospitals are an important missing set of data. The data also include specialty
hospitals which are not relevant for my purposes. A heart hospital, for example, is very
unlikely to decide to start offering labor and delivery services or neonatal intensive care. I
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Description Count Fraction Mean Variance
Total Hospitals, 1990 315 - - -
Total Hospitals, 2012 280 - - -
Hospitals For-Profit - 0.45 - -
Level III, 1990 54 .17 - -
Level III, 2012 101 .37 - -
Level II, 1990 31 0.09 - -
Level II, 2012 28 0.10 - -
Level III Capacity (Beds) - - 21 17.69
Level II Capacity (Beds) - - 7 4.6
Pediatric
Intensive Care - 0.09 - -
Obstetrics
Level (1-3) - - 1.6 0.69
Total Deliveries > 20 Wks. - - 1183 1722
Total Beds - - 168 182
Full-time
Registered Nurses 190 270
Unique Counties Represented 155 0.61 - -
Fraction in
Metropolitan Areas - 0.62 - -
Table 1.6: Summary Statistics for Hospitals
exclude hospitals unless the number of births it sees in some year in the data exceeds 10.
This enables me to capture some rural hospitals which do see births in very low numbers,
and could upgrade the services they provide. Summary statistics about the hospitals in the
sample are in Table (1.6).
The map in Figure (1.5) shows the coverage by county. Most hospitals in the state
are located in cities or suburban areas. Counties with no number had no hospitals in any
year of the DSHS survey period.
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Transitions Count
Level II Total 88
Level I to Level II 66
Level III to Level II 22
Level III Total 111
Level II to Level III 49
Level I to Level III 62
Table 1.7: State Transitions Observed
1.4.2 Data on Inpatient Admissions
The main source of inpatient data is the Texas Hospital Inpatient Discharge Public
Use Data File, published quarterly since 1999. The Public Use Data File contains discharge-
level records of hospital admissions, including a wide range of diagnosis and procedure codes
for nearly all inpatient admissions in the state, including nearly all of the births recorded
in the state each year. The 2005 file records about 381,000 births, while there were roughly
385,000 births in the state in that year ([103]). Patient DRG (diagnosis-related group)
codes, which for the pregnant women and infants are never missing, enable me to identify
the fraction of infants born at low birth weight in the inpatient data. [72] report that 8.3% of
all babies born in Texas in 2005 (roughly 31,000) were low birth weight. The inpatient data
do include hospital charges, but actual transacted prices, whether from insurers to hospitals
or patients to hospitals, are not available in my data. I will discuss this limitation at greater
length later.
For each patient, I observe the five digit zip code of residence, provided more than 10
patients from the zip code are in the inpatient discharge records. This requirement is easily
met nearly everywhere in the state. The map in Figure (1.6) illustrates the coverage of the
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Description N Fraction Mean Variance
Infants: Males 194,605 - -
Length of Stay - - 3.59 8.62
Unique Zip Codes
Represented 1734 - -
Patients Per Zip - - 1306 984
Unique Counties 244 0.96 - -
Hispanic Origin - 0.45 - -
White - 54.5 - -
African-American - 10.5 - -
Medicaid Patients 184,457 0.49 - -
Commercial Insurance 150,792 0.39 - -
Mean Total Charges 8558 46214
Risk of Mortality
(1-4) - - 1.04 .29
Unique Hospitals 230 - - -
Table 1.8: Patient Summary: 2005 Data
inpatient data: the shapes are US Census Zip Code Tabulation Areas. The blank areas are
parts of the state with extremely low population. Using all of the years of available inpatient
admissions data, I can compute the mean and variance of the number of patients in each
DRG category at the zip code level. There are seven pregnancy-related DRGs (numbered 385
- 391 prior to 2007) and the number of patients in each category varies by year by zip code.
I use these zip-code level means and variances to draw the size of the patient population in
my simulations.
I do not observe any patients’ insurance provider, so I cannot make any inferences
about which hospitals are in or out of network for any patient. I do, however, differentiate
between patients with Medicaid and patients with private insurance. Hospital choice sets
are constructed in the following way: the choice set is taken to be the closest 10 hospitals
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within 50 miles, plus an outside option. I exclude patients for which the measured distance
from the chosen hospital to the zip code is greater than 70 miles. This represents the
99th percentile of the data on measured distances from hospitals to zip code centers for all
patients. For example, in the full sample of patients from 2005, there are 2,800,000 inpatient
discharge records (including all non-labor and delivery related admissions). Limiting to those
inpatient discharges which are associated with labor and delivery episodes, I find that 48% of
all discharges covered by Medicaid and 41% are covered by private insurance. Since these are
the vast majority of the sample, the exclusion of those covered by other types of insurance
is justified.
1.4.3 Data on Volume Effects
The birth certificate data which I use also comes from the Texas Department of
State Health Services, covering a period from 2005-2012, and includes infant who was either
admitted to a NICU, who died within 28 days after birth, or who was low birth weight
(< 2500 grams, which includes very low birth weight). For these patients, I have information
about the hospital in which the birth occurred, a variety of covariates concerning the birth
itself (e.g., C-section or vaginal, etc.), plus health status information for the mother and the
infant. This data also includes the name of the destination facility for any transfer of the
mother or the infant. This information can be matched with information from the Annual
Hospital Survey about facilities available at the hospital for 90% of all records in the data.
Each record can be matched to the zip code of the mother’s residence, then distance to the
chosen facility is computed.
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1.4.4 National Birth Certificate Data
Finally, in a few places I make use of the National Center for Health Statistics’
Linked Birth/Infant Death Cohort Data. This dataset combines information from birth
certificates (without the hospital ID) with some limited discharge information and represents
the complete set of infants issued birth certificates in every state each year. Because it
excludes the identity of the hospital, I cannot make direct inferences about the volume of
patients in a particular hospital using this source. It contains a broad spectrum of covariates
recording information about the mother, father, place and manner of delivery, prenatal care,
health conditions related to the infant, and other relevant data. NICU admissions are also
recorded. For infants and neonates who died within one year, there is a supplementary file
which records information relating to the cause of death. I use this information to compute
the probability of admission to an NICU as a function of maternal age, and also to measure
the changes in average maternal age over time. This data enables me to count the number
of patients admitted to the NICU within counties, count the total number of births, and
assess the rates of various complications in the entire state over time.
1.5 Model
The model has three components: a demand model in which patients choose a hospital
for their birth episodes, a model of the volume-outcome relationship and a structural hospital
investment model. The first model is static, the second two are dynamic. I combine all three
to compute my counterfactuals and welfare measures.
Demand for hospital services is the sum of all of the individual demands for the service
at each DRG in every given period. For the purposes of the simulation, the parameters of the
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individual choice model are recovered separately for Medicaid and privately insured patients
since these populations may differ along a number of important dimensions. Each period of
the simulation, I draw from zip-code level means and variances of the number of patients
in each of seven pregnancy-related DRGs to represent the patient population in that year
in that zip code, capturing the fact that there is substantial heterogeneity in the mean and
variance of the number of patients giving birth each year at the zip code level. Each patient
drawn in each DRG category chooses her preferred hospital among the 10 in her choice set,
or chooses the outside option.
I merge data on hospitals from the Annual Survey of Hospitals into the inpatient
data. This enables me to determine whether a given hospital has neonatal intensive or
intermediate care. I can also determine which other hospitals in the patient’s choice set
offered these services, as well as distances, number of beds, whether the hospital is closest,
or any other relevant feature.
1.5.1 Patient Choice Model
I suppose that the patient and her doctor makes a utility-maximizing choice of hospital
as a function of their distance from the facility, the facility’s level of service (intensive or
intermediate), whether it is the closest facility to the patient and an interaction between the
distance to the facility and the number of beds, plus an error. Because of the important role
of the doctor in determining the choice, this is best thought of as a joint decision between
the doctor and the patient (this is a common assumption in this literature, e.g., [62]). The
patient’s utility specification is linear in these features of the hospital. Utility for patient i
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at hospital j has the form
Ui,j = U¯i,j(Hj, Xi, λi,j) + i,j
= αHj + βXi + γλi,j +H
′
jΩXi + i,j (1.1)
where Hj is a vector of hospital characteristics, Xi a vector of patient characteristics,
λi,j the distance from i to j and i,j is a Type-I Extreme Value error. Patient characteristics
here are the patient’s DRG, hospital characteristics are the levels of NICU services provided
(Level II or Level III). An interaction between the number of beds and the distance to
the patient’s zip code is also included. The results of the model indicate that patients are
sensitive to distance, and have strong preferences for higher level NICU facilities.
Medicaid and privately insured women in the same zip code are assumed to face
the same choice sets for hospitals. This is a necessary simplification, given that insurance
networks are unobserved, but this problem is common in this literature, for example in [102].
Most Texas Medicaid patients are on Medicaid managed care, which means that they will
generally face restricted networks too, but these networks are also unobserved. Therefore, I
assume that all patients can choose among all of their closest available hospitals. In practice,
more than 80% of women in the data choose one of the 10 closest hospitals to their zip code
of residence. I have estimated another version of the model which allows patients to choose
among their 50 closest hospitals. Those results are in Table (1.10). Relative to the model
with fewer choices, the coefficients on measures of distance stay the same, while those for
the intensive and intermediate facilities increase substantially. For computational reasons,
I use the model with fewer choices in my simulations: increasing the number of choices for
each patient slows estimation down dramatically.
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Variables Mean Variance
Distance (miles) 8 6.5
Intensive 0.52 .49
Intermediate 0.14 0.34
Closest 0.185 -
Dist × Beds
Table 1.9: Patient Choice Model Parameters: 10 Closest Hospitals
While some cost information is included in the inpatient data for both privately
insured and Medicaid patients, the prices submitted are on the basis of full charges. They
do not represent either how much the insurance company paid the hospital (generally a
steep discount over the full charges) or how much the patient’s copay was. It is impossible
to include any measure of the price the patient actually paid to receive the service. This,
too, is a frequent data limitation in this literature, e.g., [62].
It is an important identifying assumption in the model that women do not simply
choose the closest hospital, ignoring other hospital characteristics, such as facility levels.
Fortunately, this is not what we observe. The average distance to the closest hospital in the
choice set is 5 miles. The average distance to the chosen hospital is 11 miles. Excluding
those who traveled 75 miles or more, more than 80% of all women choose one of the 10
closest hospitals, but only 18% choose the closest. The fraction of women choosing the N-th
closest hospital is plotted in Figure (1.12). Hospitals further away than the 10 closest are
combined into one category at the right.
The results of this model when estimated jointly and separately for Medicaid and
privately insured patients (without any DRG-specific terms) appear in table (1.11). The
coefficients all have the expected signs: patients prefer closer facilities and value higher levels
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Coeff. Combined Priv. Ins. Medicaid
Dist. -0.17 -0.20 -0.16
(0.0009) (0.002) (0.001)
Dist. Sq. 0.0004 0.00056 0.0004
(4.5e-06) (7.5e-06) (7.0e-06)
Intensive 6.82 7.90 6.21
(0.17) (0.42) (0.20)
Intermediate 5.34 6.98 4.58
(0.115) (0.185) (0.186)
Distance×Beds 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Closest? 0.343 0.209 0.441
(0.01) (0.019) (0.017)
N 86,279 35,819 42,057
Hospital FEs Y Y Y
Table 1.10: Patient Choice Model Parameters: 50 Closest Hospitals
of service. The coefficients are very similar across the patient categories, though Medicaid
patients show greater sensitivity to distance, perhaps reflecting an increased cost of traveling.
The results in this table are similar to those in [55], though those authors use travel times
instead of distance in miles. All of these features of the data are observed, so this model is
estimated by maximum likelihood.
1.5.2 Volume-Outcome Relationship
Birth certificate data covering 2005 to 2012 enables me to estimate the relationship
between patient volume and the quality of patient outcomes in Texas NICU’s. This is
described at greater length in my paper [16]. I use birth-certificate data to compute a
complete count of all patients admitted to the NICU at each hospital in the state. I have
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Coeff. Combined Priv. Ins. Medicaid
Dist. -0.179 -0.19 -0.189
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Dist. Sq. 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.00007) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Intensive 2.635 2.485 2.689
(0.113) (0.136) (0.227)
Intermediate 0.425 0.404 0.447
(0.091) (0.14) (0.153)
Distance×Beds -0.001 -0.0014 -0.001
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Closest? 0.332 0.263 0.331
(0.014) (0.024) (0.02)
N 86,279 35,819 42,057
Hospital FEs Y Y Y
Table 1.11: Patient Choice Model Parameters
information about the month and year of birth, so I can compute how many patients were
at each NICU during each month. This enables me to compute various capacity measures,
but it also permits me to investigate how the number of patients admitted to the NICU
affects the outcomes for those patients admitted subsequently. Summary statistics about
this patient population for each year in the data are included in Table (1.13).
I present the results of several models measuring the effects of patient volume on
quality in [16]. The results are consistent with earlier estimates from [88] and others, who
also find a negative effect of higher patient volume on mortality (though [88] observe patient
volumes by calendar year only). I report two sets of estimates here. First, I estimate a probit
model for mortality, controlling for individual health states Xi, gestational age ψw (which is
closely correlated with birth weight), year fixed effects φt, patient insurance status pis, and
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including a lagged hospital-specific volume term vh which records NICU admissions for the
previous quarter. I also include an indicator for whether the patient is very low birth weight.
The coefficient of interest is the γ on the lagged patient volume.
y∗i,h,t = α + βXi + γvh +
∑
w
ψw +
∑
t
φt +
∑
s
pis + δ1wt<1500g. + i (1.2)
yi = 1{y∗i>0} (1.3)
Without correcting for endogeneity in patient volume, I find that the coefficient γ is
negative is negative and precisely estimated: higher patient volumes lead to lower mortality
probabilities later. The value is reported in Table (1.12). Admission to a particular hospital
is not randomly assigned, but is endogenously determined by the patient and doctor jointly.
In particular, choices are likely to be a function of unobserved hospital quality.
The most plausible selective referral pattern biases estimation against finding any
negative effect of volume on the probability of mortality. If hospitals differ in unobserved
quality and patients in an unobserved mortality risk type, sicker patients at higher risk
of mortality are likely to be referred to higher quality hospitals. This raises the average
mortality risk of the population at higher-quality hospitals (which also have a higher volume
of patients). At the same time, it lowers average mortality risk in the population at hospitals
which are referring patients out (which now have lower patient volumes). Provided there
are not transfers of lower-mortality-risk patients from high quality facilities to lower-quality
facilities, which seems unlikely, the naive estimation of volume effects on quality is likely to
underestimate the role of volume in producing quality outcomes. An instrument for patient
27
volume which I will outline in subsequent paragraphs permits identifying the underlying
causal effects.
I estimate the same model again, instrumenting for patient volume using predicted
patient volume a strategy similar to one used by [44], and [54]. [54] estimate a model of
patient choice as a function of patient, hospital and patient-hospital (e.g., distance) char-
acteristics. They aggregate the probabilities of choice across patients to create a measure
of predicted patient flows. These patient counts then are used to instrument for hospital
volume: they should be correlated with actual hospital volume, but will not otherwise affect
patient mortality.
Similarly, [44] count the number of patients at a set of fixed radii, the number of
hospitals, and a set of year dummies to instrument for volume. These capture the fact
that a hospital’s volume depends on both the number of patients and the number of other
hospitals in the market. [44] do not estimate a patient choice model on the basis of hospital
features, but this makes sense in their setting since hospitals providing the procedure they
study (coronary artery bypass grafts) are not distinguished by level.
My procedure is similar to that in [54]: I compute the patient choice model as a
function of exogenous characteristics of patients and the hospital, then sum the resulting
choice probabilities. This gives a measure of volume which is not correlated with unobserved
facility quality - by construction since the choice model was estimated with only observable
characteristics. I use this predicted measure as an instrument for actual hospital volume.
I give all patients the choice of any of the 50 hospitals closest to their zip code of
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residence.5 The instrument captures the fraction of variation in volume that is driven by
observable characteristics of the facilities, not by unobservable quality. The main identifying
assumptions are that the predicted volume vˆh is correlated with actual hospital volume vh,
and that vˆh does not enter into the mortality function (2.1) and is orthogonal to the error
in (2.1).
I use this to instrument for quality in the following probit model:
y∗i,h,t = α + βXi + γvh +
∑
w
ψw +
∑
t
φt +
∑
s
pis + δ1wt<1500g. + i (1.4)
vh = α
′ + β′Xi +
∑
w
ψ′w +
∑
t
φ′t +
∑
s
pi′s + γ
′vˆh + ′i (1.5)
yi = 1y∗i>0 (1.6)
Volume vh is endogenous. The exogeneity of volume is rejected across all of the IV
specifications I use. I report the quarterly lagged volume coefficients in Table (1.12). I have
estimated specifications with prior year volume, prior quarter, four prior quarters, prior
month and prior 12 months and I find similar outcomes across specifications.
As expected the coefficient on lagged volume is negative and significant. The partial
effects of volume at the mean of other covariates are presented in Figure (2.1). The sign of
the effect is compatible with a plausible story of endogenous patient referral across facilities.
In the simulations I conduct later, I use the mortality risks implied by the partial effects in
Figure (2.1). Another feature to emphasize about these results is that the effects themselves
5In the average quarter, the 50th-closest hospital is chosen by about 40 of 85,000 patients. On average,
fewer than 50 patients per quarter choose any hospital 45th-closest or further. The 50th-closest hospital is
on average 60 miles away from the center of the patient’s zip code, with a standard deviation of 36 miles.
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are of significant magnitude. The effect of moving a patient from the lowest volume facility
to the highest volume one cuts the patient’s mortality risk by two thirds.
Probit IV Probit
Neonatal Death
Prior Quarter NICU Admits -0.000567∗∗∗ -0.000209∗
(0.0000728) (0.0000985)
Observations 185817 185817
Health States Y Y
Gestational Age Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.12: Volume Outcome Probits
Several alternative specifications are estimated in [16]. The results I present here are
for the lagged prior quarter volume, but the results are substantially similar when using prior
month or prior year. In [16] I also estimate several models to demonstrate that the more
recent the volume is, the more important an effect it has in terms of reducing the mortality
rate. The results suggest that improvements in mortality rates due to learning at the facility
are quickly forgotten. For more details, see [16].
1.5.3 Hospital Investment
My model of hospital behavior fits into the framework of [39] and [36]. Time is
discrete, and the horizon is infinite. Each firm is a single hospital. Each firm’s state is a
vector
ni = (li, h
0−5
1 , h
0−5
2 , h
0−5
3 , h
5−15
1 , h
5−15
2 , h
5−15
3 , h
15−25
1 , h
15−25
2 , h
15−25
3 )
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Characteristic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Patients 43082 45338 46039 47132 48039 46647 45660 46400
Mortality Rate (/1000) 33.5 32.4 31.0 30.2 28.5 29.7 28.5 28.4
Percent Born in Hospital 99.7 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.5 99.6 99.6
Unique Hospitals 273 275 267 271 276 262 264 261
Fraction Male 0.508 0.506 0.505 0.510 0.509 0.508 0.510 0.510
Estimated Weeks Gestation 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
(S.D.) (4.5) (4.4) (4.5) (4.4) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2)
Birth Weight (grams) 2312 2313 2309 2328 2343 2369 2372 2390
(S.D.) (779) (783) (776) (773) (781) (788) (795) (820)
Transferred (%) 7.5 6.8 6.9 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.4 5.2
Distances Traveled
Average Distance Traveled 12.8 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.7
(S.D.) (14.6) (14.1) (14.1) (14.3) (13.8) (14.1) (14.5) (14.4)
Distance 5th Percentile 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
Distance 95th Percentile 38.1 36.8 36.7 37.6 37.0 36.8 37.7 37.7
Insurance Status
Medicaid 43.6 43.7 43.8 46.8 49.2 50.2 50.4 48.8
Private 37.6 35.9 36.6 36.8 35.7 35.4 35.8 36.0
Self-pay 13.9 16.9 14.4 10.7 9.0 8.3 7.3 7.5
Other/Unknown 4.8 3.51 5.2 5.75 6.1 6.2 6.5 7.7
Table 1.13: Birth Certificate Sample Characteristics
31
of the level of its competitors at distances 0-5 miles, 5-15 miles and 15-25 miles and its own
level li. This reflects the fact that a hospital will view the same investment by different firms
in its market as a better or worse substitute for the service which it provides. Hospitals which
are better substitutes are more important to the hospital’s strategic behavior. Naturally, its
investment decisions also depend on what level of facility already exists at the hospital. The
firm also observes a private shock ti each period. The 
t
i’s are independently and identically
distributed. Private information shocks are needed to ensure the existence of pure-strategy
equilibria, as in [36]. The firm’s state is characterized by the pair xti = {nti, ti}.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Short-lived, non-strategic entrants choose to enter or not. If they do not, they vanish.6
2. Firms observe their public states nti and their private shocks 
t
i.
3. Firms simultaneously choose actions ati
4. Patients choose their facilities according to the model above.
5. Firm payoffs piti are realized
6. Facility changes occur and patients information about changes to existing facilities and
any new entrants is updated. Firms which exit realize a scrap value.
I permit entry of an entirely new hospital into the market in the model, though
entry is not observed frequently in the data. I suppose that each period in each county
6There is no “optimal waiting” to enter the market.
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there is one non-strategic potential entrant, who can decide to stay out, or enter at Level
I, II or III. Entrants are drawn for each county in the state separately. (This is the only
part of the model in which county geography matters - all other modeling and computation
choices reflect actual distances, not county boundaries.) I use the empirical probabilities of
entry from the data to inform this part of the model. Each hospital that enters a county is
randomly assigned a location in the market in the county. This permits the computation of
a distance to each relevant zip code. Entrants are assigned a number of beds equal to the
mean bed number over facilities in the market. These characteristics are fixed. Hospitals
which enter the market become available to patients, so their entry can affect the demand for
the other facilities that remain in the market. In subsequent periods they have the option to
make the same investment, divestment or exit decisions that hospitals actually in the data
make.
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Level 1
Level 2
Exit
Level 3
Firms face demand, which is a function of mutable features of their facilities (i.e.,
whether they have Level I, II or III facilities). Several features which affect demand are
treated as immutable: the total number of beds and the firm’s location with respect to
patients. Patient demand is computed according to the model estimated above in Equation
(1.1) for every period. Patients’ deterministic utilities for each hospital are updated every
time any facility in one of their choice sets changes. Patients’ choice sets are also updated
to reflect entrants. During every simulation period, patient demand is computed across the
entire state. Demand for each hospital is summed up at the DRG level across all patients
who have the hospital in the choice set. Different patients in the same zip code can choose
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to go to hospitals which are not in the same county market, depending on their utilities,
DRGs and private shocks. Firms realize profits separately from serving the two insurance
types of patients. Firm variable profits are given by
pii(xi,t, x−i,t) = V Pi,t(xi,t, x−i,t) + i,t
= V P P (xi,t, x−i,t) + V PM(xi,t, x−i,t) + i,t
where V PM and V P P denote the variable profits due to Medicaid and privately
insured patients, respectively. The hospital pays a cost to treat each patient which is deter-
mined by that patient’s DRG and which is the same across both categories of patients.
Since actual transacted prices are not observed in this setting, I also use the choice
model to understand what effects investment has on the patient’s willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for access to the hospital (for WTP see [111] and [24]). The WTP measure is motivated
by a model in which patients choose insurance networks ex-ante, prior to the realization
of any health states. With a simple logit demand model for patient choice of hospital, an
expression for the aggregate WTP of any (location, health state) pair is readily computed.
The derivation which follows is very close to that of [24]. The discrete choice model above
in (1.1) gives the patient’s utility from hospital choice as a function of several demographic
and clinical indicators. The utility of patient i from choosing hospital g among the set G
is given below. This result can be found in [24] or [5]. Conveniently, the expression for the
expectation of the maximum value has a closed form, making the assumption that the error
terms ij are distributed Type-I Extreme Value, two useful results follow.:
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WTP (G,X, λ) = E
[
max
g∈G
U¯i,g(Hg, Xi, λi,j) + i,g
]
= ln
[∑
g∈G
exp
(
U¯i,g(Hg, Xi, λi,j)
)]
Furthermore, the probability that patient i chooses a particular hospital j is given by
the standard formula
sj =
exp {U(H,X, λ)}∑
g∈G exp {U(H,Xi, λi)}
(1.7)
This is also interpretable as the market share of patients of type (X,λ), or the share
of patients of clinical and demographic type X who live at location λ. The second useful
result is that a solution for the utility given by the maximizing choice of hospital among the
set G can be derived in closed form.
[24] use this expression to derive an expression for the WTP of a patient i of type
(X,Z, λ) to pay for the inclusion of hospital k in the network of her insurer. They treat
this expression as one component of the surplus over which insurers and hospitals bargain.
Aggregating over all patient types, including demographics Xi, clinical characteristics Zi,
and locations λi gives a composite measure of WTP for the complete set of hospital services
over patients in the market defined by G (which is not constant across patient types). This
aggregate WTP for hospital k is one component of the surplus over which insurers and
hospitals bargain (the other component, not relevant or modeled here, is the reduction, or
not, in cost to the network from including hospital k).
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E
[
max
g∈G
U(H, Y,X, λ) + ig
]
− E
[
max
g∈G−{k}
U(H,Y,X, λ) + ig
]
(1.8)
ln
[∑
g∈G
exp {U(Hg, Y, Z, λi)}
]
− ln
 ∑
g∈G−{k}
exp {U(Hg, Y, Z, λi)}
 (1.9)
= ln
 ∑
g∈G−{k}
exp(U(H, Y, Z, λ)∑
g∈G exp(U(H, Y, Z, λ)
−1 (1.10)
= ln
[
1
1− sk(Hk, Y, Z, λ)
]−1
(1.11)
The interpretation of this expression is that the ex-ante willingness to pay of an
individual i of type (Xi, Zi, λi) for access to hospital k is inversely related to the share of
patients of that type at that hospital.
Willingness to pay is not the same as realized revenue. WTP is measured in patient
utils, but it does reasonably approximate the market-level valuation for the hospital’s services
across patient types and locations. However, the hospital’s profit function is reasonably
predicted to be a function f(.) of this measure. To simplify computation, I suppose that the
function f() of willingness to pay is linear in WTP: f(WTP ) = αtWTP (Zi, Yi, λi), and that
this αt is constant across patient demographic, clinical and location types. It is permitted
to vary across the level of the hospital facility. αt converts patient utils to dollars.
The hospital’s cost function c(Zi, Yi) depends on patient clinical and demographic
types, but not on the patient’s location. As noted above, hospital’s serve two types of
patients in this model: those with private insurance and those who are publicly insured
under Medicaid. This is a very close to the data: about 90% of patients in the inpatient
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data are covered by one of these two types of insurance. Denote the patient volumes as
V T (Xi, Zi, λi), where T = P,M for Medicaid or Privately Insured patients of a particular
(Xi, Zi, λi) type. Medicaid prices for patients in traditional Medicaid are not chosen by the
hospital, but are instead set administratively according to the patient’s clinical type Zi. For
those in managed Medicaid, prices are bargained over by the patient’s managed Medicaid
provider. These prices (and whether any individual patient is in managed or traditional
Medicaid) are both unknown, so I treat these patients as being the same for reimbursement
purposes. Then the hospital’s profit over patient demographic types Yi ∈ Y , clinical types
Zi ∈ Z and locations λi ∈ Λ can be written:
pik =
∑
zi∈Z
∑
yi∈Y
∑
λi∈Λ
(f(WTP (Hk, Zi, Yi, λi))− C(Zi, Yi))V p(Zi, Yi, λi) (1.12)
+
(
P¯ (Zi)− C(Zi, Yi)
)
V m(Zi, Yi, λi)
The reimbursements actually paid by Texas Medicaid to hospitals for treatment of
patients within the DRG’s of interest are available from the Texas Health and Human Services
Commission, so I treat them as known in the model. I take the mean costs within DRG as
the realized amount of reimbursement for that DRG.
In the data, I observe facility level changes at a yearly frequency, so each decision
period is one year. Each period, a hospital can decide to upgrade or downgrade its facility
(depending on its current level). Hospitals can also decide to either keep their current facility
or to exit the market. The hospital makes this decision after it has realized demand for the
period. If it does change level, the facility is upgraded or downgraded and will start attracting
new patients in the following period. Hospitals can also decide to exit the market entirely,
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shutting down and receiving some scrap value. A hospital must pay some transition costs
when it changes level, given by:
C(ai,t, ai,t−1) = 1{ai,t 6=ai,t−1,ai,t=j,ai,t−1=j}Ψ
k
j
I make the assumption that the cost can vary across the patient’s health status Zi
(i.e, a DRG) and the level of the hospital’s facility. Cost parameters depend on the patient’s
DRG and the level of the hospital’s facility. Denote the set of DRG’s by Y . Then the cost
function takes the form:
C(Zi, Yi) =
∑
yi∈Y
3∑
l=1
1{yi=d,l=k}γy,k (1.13)
Combining the terms above, the per-period profit function is
pik =
∑
zi∈Z
∑
yi∈Y
∑
λi∈Λ
(
f(WTP (Zi, Yi, λi))−
3∑
l=1
1{d=i,l=k}γi,k
)
V p(Zi, Yi, λi) (1.14)
+
(
P¯ (Zi)−
3∑
l=1
1{y=i,l=k}γi,k
)
V m(Zi, Yi, λi)
The fact that the profit function is linear in the parameters to be estimated greatly
eases the computation burden. This modeling strategy is frequently pursued in this litera-
ture, e.g., [95]. Under this assumption, the value function can be approximated once and
values easily computed under a variety of parameter values without redoing the approxima-
tion.
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1.6 Estimation/Empirical Strategy
The estimation strategy is based on [9]. In the first stage, I recover estimates of the
probabilities of the three behaviors: investment, divestment, or exit. In the second stage,
I use the estimated probabilities to compute approximations to the value function under
equilibrium and non-equilibrium strategies. I recover the parameters by minimizing the set
of deviations from the equilibrium conditions.
For each market-year I simulate 500 Monte Carlo approximations of the value func-
tion, in which each approximation draws 40 simulated years. In each period, potential
entrants decide to enter or not at the beginning of the period. If entry occurs, the entering
hospital will not realize any demand until the next period. This can be interpreted as a
time-to-build constraint: it takes one year to build and staff a new hospital.
Since the profit function is linear, the simulation can be run once. A set of parameter
values minimizing the criterion function can be found. I recover the parameters using the
Laplace-type estimator of [26]. The criterion function is in [9]:
Qn(θ, α) :=
1
nI
nI∑
k=1
(min {gˆ(Xk; θ, α) , 0})2
where the function gˆ is min {V (σ; θ)− V (σ′; θ), 0}. V (σ; θ) and V (σ′; θ) are approxi-
mations of the value function estimated from the equilibrium behavior σ and a perturbation
of that equilibrium behavior σ′. θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. To form the sim-
ulated policy functions, I take the equilibrium policies and perturb them by a small . The
assumption that the observed behavior represents a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium means
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that we must have V (σ; θ) ≥ V (σ′; θ). Parameters are chosen to minimize the violations of
that constraint over all hospitals in the model
1.6.1 First Stage: Policy Functions
In the first stage, I estimate the firm’s probability of investing, divesting, exiting
or remaining where it is as a function of the firm’s state: its own level and the levels of
its neighbors, as outlined in the model section above. I impose a logit functional form on
the firm’s choice and include a polynomial in the state variables ([10]). I use the model of
behavior so obtained to simulate firm behavior in response to arbitrary investment behaviors
by competitors or new entrants.
1.6.2 Estimation Results
The first set of estimates I recover are the per-patient per-DRG costs of an admission.
The magnitudes are reasonable. I compare them to two other sets of available information.
First, I obtained DRG-level reimbursement under Texas Medicaid for every hospital in the
state. I report the values for 2012, which is the last available year. The values here are the
average payment hospitals actually received and the number of patients treated in that DRG
for the whole state. The second set of values is from Truven Health Analytics. The data
reported here is for Austin, TX only and for 2014 which is the only set of data available to
me. The reimbursements reported are DRG-level for only the set of employers which provide
data to Truven. This is the only data available to me on private insurance reimbursements
for these services in Texas.
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The specific pregnancy-related DRGs7 for which the costs are estimated are:
1. γ385 - “Neonates died or transferred”
2. γ386 - “Extreme Immaturity/Respiratory Distress”
3. γ387 - “Prematurity w/ Major Problems”
4. γ388 - “Prematurity w/out Major Problems”
5. γ389 - “Full-term Neonate w/ Major Problems”
6. γ390 - “Neonate w/ Other Significant Problems”
7. γ391 - “Normal Newborn”
The estimated parameter values follow in Table (1.14). The estimates are reasonable
because, for the most part, the estimated costs lie in between the Medicaid values and the
private insurance values.
One of the central trade-offs in this market is that, while hospital entry may disperse
volume and lead to worse outcomes, it might also lower prices through increased competition.
If that is the case, then individuals may end up receiving a slightly lower-quality service, but
they may also pay less for it. It appears that additional competitors do not lower hospital’s
profits for NICU services in an appreciable way. Hospital profits are decreasing only slightly
or perhaps not at all as the number of competitors increases. This suggests that hospitals
7The γ parameters are numbered according to their actual DRG numbers given by CMS.
42
γValue
(Lev. 1)
(Lev. 2)
(Lev. 3) Std. Err.
Texas Medicaid
Mean/(Var.)
(2012)
TX Med.
N
Truven Health
Mean/(Var.)
(Austin, 2014)
Truven
N
γ385
20680
42692
20962
7285
6326
6355
12044
(19162)
2267 -
2731
34232
(93482) 9
γ386
81918
74193
99065
18347
18409
18575
45323
(31888)
3965 -
4269
172357
(258559) 55
γ387
30405
49801
22376
26172
36150
26096
15751
(11659)
2891 -
3219
34690
(49802) 64
γ388
10051
19019
33963
1211
1289
1351
4413
(3997)
6217 -
6553
18412
(43618) 42
γ389
29122
14279
20708
1257
1236
1235
6330
(7946)
6333 -
6673
10283
(38945) 338
γ390
22830
6754
3667
755
786
716
1529
(1885)
22339 -
22711
3756
(4504) 383
γ391
9089
8120
3667
684
683
659
570
(534)
106178 -
106474
2045
(1065) 638
Table 1.14: Parameter Values
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still have considerable power vis-a-vis the insurers they bargain with, at least for NICU
services.
Estimated entry costs follow in Table (1.15). The facility investment costs estimates
are less precisely estimated than other parameters, because the investment decision modeled
here is a coarsening of the actual investment decisions that firms contemplate. The firm’s
decision would be more accurately modeled as the choice of a level and a size (a number of
beds).
Table (1.22) records the sizes of NICU facilities every 2 years for my sample period.
The standard deviation in facility sizes is large relative to the mean, as is the difference
between the maximum and minimum sizes in the sample. The costs associated with adjusting
the number of beds in a NICU up or down may be marginal relative to the cost of the whole
facility, but there are still substantial unmodeled cost differences between building a NICU
of two beds and building one of 118 beds. This modeling choice is needed to keep the size
of the state space manageable.
The choice of 3 NICU facility levels, plus an exit state, gives four total choices for each
period. By contrast, supposing that hospitals make level and size choices with only three size
options (e.g.,‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’) for levels 2 and 3 leads to a tremendous increase
in the size of the state space.8 To minimize the complexity of computations, I restrict firms
to a coarser strategy.
8The size of the state space is discussed more completely when I compute the counterfactuals.
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Parameter Value Std.Err.
α1 829 285
α2 36166 6326
α3 16309 6355
Ψ1,2 1937550 1881520
Ψ1,3 4937363 1881526
Ψ1,EX -6218 36125
Ψ2,1 82164 93623
Ψ2,3 2062763 2006142
Ψ2,EX 3497 93623
Ψ3,1 -1700590 193879
Ψ3,2 -163005 21983
Ψ3,EX 31229 36342
Table 1.15: Willingness to Pay (α) and Fixed Investment Costs (Ψ)
1.7 Identification
The parameters to estimate are the αi terms, which multiply WTP for each of the
three levels, the γi,k terms which represent firm costs of treating patients at different DRG’s,
levels and insurance types and the Ψk,l terms which capture the fixed costs of level changes
or exiting. Part of the model identification comes from the fact that the underlying returns
to investment are changing differentially across the state as the population grows, while the
number of new hospitals is stable or declining. For example, from July 2014 to July 2015,
the population of the state increased by 490,000.9 84% of this increase happened in just four
metro areas: Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Austin and San Antonio.10 The population of
9US Census Bureau, 2016.
10These are the top four metro areas by population in the state. There are 25 metro areas in total.
The other 6 in the top 10 are McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, El Paso, Corpus Christi, Brownsville-Harlingen,
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, and Beaumont-Port Arthur, the smallest of which has around 400,000 residents.
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Houston (excluding the metro area, 2012 population 2.1 million) increased by 24% between
1990 and 2012, while San Angelo (2012 population 96,000) increased by 14% over the same
period. These increases are observable at the zip-code level in inpatient admissions data.
The population of Texas grows substantially over the period studied in this paper: from 17
million in 1990 to about 26 million in 2012. This changes the returns to the investment for
hospitals differentially depending on their location.
The coefficients αi multiply WTP, which is computed at the zip-code level for each
patient type. WTP varies not only with investments made by firm k, but with any invest-
ment, entry or exit decisions made by any competitor accessible from any of the zip codes
from k that attracts patients (recall that patients are permitted to choose among the 10
closest hospitals to their zip code, provided that distance does not exceed 50 miles). The
responsiveness of willingness-to-pay for a given hospital k also varies across zip codes zi and
zj depending on both their distances from k, and the set of competitors of k that are acces-
sible to patients from that zip code. Distant zip codes in opposite directions from the same
hospital generally have different choice sets. WTP is computed directly in each period for
each zip code, so the total willingness to pay across all patients who might choose a given
hospital is known.
In the diagram below, Figure (1.1) this idea is illustrated in a simplified fashion.
Each circle represents all patients in each market for the three hospitals A,B and C. The
intersections of the circles are subsections of markets (zip codes) shared by more than one
firm. When hospital A changes from level 1 to level 3, all of its patients change their WTP
for hospital A. However, total WTP for hospital A also varies with the decisions made by
hospital B in regions (A,B) and (A,B,C) and with the decisions of hospital C in regions
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C
D
A,B
A,B,CA,C
B,C
A,D
Figure 1.1: Illustrating Changes in Willingness to Pay
(A,C) and (A,B,C). The individual decisions of hospitals A,B and C to invest or divest
all affect the aggregate willingness to pay for the other two hospitals. However, the decisions
of hospitals A and D each only affect the other, since they share a market not shared by the
other two facilities. This diagram is a simplification, since of course the distances involved
in real examples are not likely to be so large that it is impossible for a patient to drive past
D to seek service at B.
Patient volumes are computed directly in each period from the estimated choice
model. Patient choices respond to investment: patients prefer higher level facilities and are
aware when hospitals make changes in the levels of the NICU facilities. Patients in differ-
ent DRG’s and of different insurance types can respond differently to investment decisions,
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Levels Mean Change (%) Change SD Max Change Min Change
1 to 3 160 38 212 38
1 to 2 103 21 131 29
2 to 3 28 6 34 11
2 to 1 51 6 56 30
3 to 2 -20 3 25 9
3 to 1 -60 7 67 35
Table 1.16: Table of Changes in WTP from Changing Own Level
facilitating the identification of the γi,k terms, which vary by DRG.
The identification of the fixed costs of a hospital changing levels is best explained
with a simplified version of the model, similar to that in ([29], Appendix.) Suppose that
the components of the profit function are identified by the previous argument, so that I can
write the profit as a function of the firm’s level, e.g., pi(i). In a two-level problem, the firm
at level 1 should invest if:
pi(1) +
βpi(2)
1− β ≥ Ψ1,2
and remain at its current level if
pi(1)
1− β ≥ pi(1) +
βpi(2)
1− β −Ψ1,2
I suppose that the cost Ψ1,2 is the same across markets for all level 1 hospitals.
Profits pi(1) and pi(2) depend on the distribution of patients in each market, so the different
investment decisions of level 1 hospitals suffice to identify Ψ1,2 in this simplified example. A
similar argument can be made for the model with three level choices.
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1.8 Counterfactuals
In the following two sections, I describe two sets of counterfactuals I run with the
models estimated in this paper. The first set of counterfactuals require only the results of the
static model. In this set of simulations, I allow a social planner to impose facility restrictions
within markets.
1.8.1 Static Counterfactuals
One of the main counterfactuals I run involves a hypothetical social planner who
determines which hospitals will be permitted to have NICU’s. This affects patient decisions
about which hospitals to choose, the volume of NICU patients in each hospital, and the
distribution of revenues among hospitals. Importantly, running this counterfactual does not
require that any hospital solve a dynamic optimization problem. The investment ‘decision’ is
not made by the hospital itself, but is assigned to it. This can be compared to the perinatal
regionalization program in Portugal ([80]) or the regionalization of stroke care in London
([77]).
The first step is a baseline simulation, which takes the current market structure as
it is given. Patients are assigned to their hospitals according to the choice model. Once
assigned, they draw birth weights for their infants according to the observed probabilities
in the NCHS data. Mortality rates for very low birth weight infants at each hospital are
determined according to the estimates using Texas birth certificate data. Patient mortality
is calculated for the entire state.
There are then two versions of Certificate of Need programs: in both every market
(here defined as a county) is constrained to have a single Level III facility. In one version,
49
patients who show up at other hospitals (all level I by construction) who draw very low birth
weight infants are treated at the facility where they arrive. No patients are transferred. The
increase in patients at the single Level III facility comes from the preferences patients have
for higher level facilities ex-ante.
In the second version, patients who arrive at a hospital without a Level III facility and
realize a VLBW infant are transferred to the single Level III facility. The origin facility loses
some revenue associated with that patient, while the destination facility gains revenue. The
Level III improves its outcomes treating all VLBW patients due to realizing a higher patient
volume equal to the total number of VLBW patients in the market. These two possibilities
are an upper and a lower bound on the effects of regionalizing and concentrating volume.
An actual regionalization program would inevitably have less than perfect compliance with
a transfer program and some patients might die in transit.
These two counterfactual arrangements are not unrealistic when compared to existing
CON regulation schemes. Some CON regulation schemes do restrict Level III services to a
single facility in a large district, as in New York State. New York is divided into seven regions
of 1 - 14 counties. Each block outside of New York City generally has one or two high-level
“regional” intensive care centers. Transfer arrangements are quite successful in perinatal
care and mortality is very low. California (which does not regulate NICU investment via
CON) has a public system to track the availability of open beds in NICU’s at each hospital
in the state in real time.11 The time taken to transfer is unlikely to be an issue for most
11For Northern California, see http://www.perinatal.org/BedAvailability.aspx?region=nocal and for
Southern California, see http://www.perinatal.org/BedAvailability.aspx?region=socal
50
Counterfactual 1 2
Description
CON
Monopoly
CON
Regionalization
∆ Mortality
(Variance)
156
(31)
219
(26)
∆ Profit
(Variance)
−3.7× 1e6
(2.45e6)
−2.8× 10e6
(3.8e6)
∆ HHI
(Variance)
132
(27)
299
(60)
Table 1.17: Static Counterfactual Results
patients, since labor has long average duration.12
1.8.2 Dynamic Counterfactuals
The other set of counterfactuals requires the set of dynamic parameters estimated
earlier. First I will describe the two solution procedures applied.
1.8.2.1 Solving the Dynamic Model
I apply two methods to solve the model. The first is the exact solution outlined in
[85]. This method works well because the state space of the model is not very large in smaller
markets: each firm can be in one of 4 states (Levels 1-3 and the exit state). There are 4N
possible market configurations in each market with N firms, where N is the total number of
firms within 25 miles. Since firms are symmetric, and since the state varies depending on
distance, the number of distinct states is lower. For example, in a three hospital market,
12There are three stages: the infant is born during the second and the placenta is discharged during the
third. Early labor lasts 8-12 hours, and active labor 3 - 5. Labor is considered precipitous when the child is
born within less than three hours of the onset of regular contractions. This affected about 2.5% of all births
in the US in 2010.
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suppose that hospitals A, B and C are all at level 1. Suppose that hospitals B and C are each
10 miles from A. From the point of view of Hospital A, the state is the same when Hospital
B has level 2 and Hospital C has level 3, and when Hospital C has level 2 and Hospital B
has level 3. When updating the value of each aggregate state, I cycle through all possible
configurations of the state of each hospital in the market. The number of configurations
of n hospitals over k possible states, when the number at each state is constrained to be
non-negative, is given by
(
n+k−1
n
)
.
The most time-consuming part of the computation is updating the deterministic
component of the utility of consumers for each different configuration of states. When
markets are small enough that the update does not take much time for each iteration, I iterate
over all possible states at each iteration and compute the value of all of them. Convergence
is judged by checking the distance between successive iterations of the algorithm. When the
increase is small enough, convergence is achieved. I use 10−5 as my convergence criterion. To
my knowledge, there are no algorithms akin to value iteration that guarantee convergence
in this type of model, but when an equilibrium is found, it can be verified.
Once a firm has more than 5 and fewer than 10 neighbors I compute the value approx-
imately, rather than exactly. For these markets, I apply the methods of [86]. Intermediate
sized markets include Austin and San Antonio. For larger markets, the number of total
states grows very large very fast as the number of neighboring hospitals increases. There are
two obstacles to computation: the size of the full state (all 4n configurations) is too large
to hold in memory as a set of tuples of (Hospital ID, State) once there are more than 14
neighbors. Furthermore, the time taken to update the deterministic component of utility for
all zip codes accessible from each hospital is too high. This makes an approximation method
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necessary.
1.8.2.2 Dynamic Simulation Results
The results of the baseline simulation in both the exact and approximated cases are
as one would expect. For nearly every firm, the value of being in its actual state exceeds
the value of its other options. For those firms which are not in their highest-valued state,
generally upgrading is more profitable than downgrading. Conditional on keeping the set
of competitors identical, I find that most firms’ actual state is its maximizing state. When
firms’ competitors exit the market, a firm may find it profitable to upgrade.
Results from the Austin market are in Table (1.18). The hospitals with much higher
values are more centrally located and see more patients as a result. The single Level II
facility in the metro area also has a lower value. Brackenridge, which is a “safety net”
hospital which sees a much higher Medicaid, uninsured and Travis County hospital district
(i.e., indigent) population, has the lowest value among the three centrally located facilities
(St David’s, Seton Med. Center and Brackenridge).
Patient revenue changes driven by level changes can be decomposed into two factors:
an increase in the number of patients, and a change in the composition of patients. From the
patient choice model, we know that general obstetrics patients value NICU services, which
is visible in Figure (1.7). However, the possibility of admitting patients to the NICU means
that hospitals will also earn more revenue on average from each patient, driven by the subset
of patients who are admitted to the NICU.
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Hospital Level (2016)
Value
×10e8
St David’s Medical Center III 9.00685951
St David’s South Austin Medical Center II .01797498
Seton Medical Center III 1.5370150
Seton Northwest III 0.1727939
Seton Southwest III 0.1335213
Brackenridge III 3.0653228
Table 1.18: Hospitals in Austin, TX
1.8.2.3 Increasing Investment Costs
In my second counterfactual, I simulate the evolution of a market under rapidly
increasing investment costs. The goal of this exercise is to achieve a regulatory regime some-
where between strict CON control and the existing free entry equilibrium. In principle, a
wide range of tariffs could be imposed by the social planner. In a somewhat more sophisti-
cated example, the planner could estimate a choice model similar to the one proposed above,
and could simulate the counterfactual flow of patients across facilities under different facility
configurations, including the flow of VLBW patients. With this model, the planner could
predict how much patient volumes will shift in the event of entry into the market. A planner
could then account for the volume effects of shifting patients around, and could charge a fee
to the potential entrant. This would force an entering hospital to internalize the costs which
entry would impose on its patients.
A simpler option for the regulator is to assess a fixed fee for each new entrant, which
is increasing in the number of facilities in the market. This fee would depend on the volume
effects, but would not take into account the specific flows of patients or the locations of
hospitals relative to the larger population. In the simulation here, I do the latter. This
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permits me to keep the fee schedule the same across markets and saves time in computing
what would otherwise be hospital-specific investment fees. In principle, other options are
available to the planner.13
The results are as one might expect: increase fees steeply enough and hospitals can
be dissuaded from investing, despite the large increases in revenue which follow from their
doing so. At some point, the costs of investment plus the fee exceed the continuation value
to the firm of the additional facility, so the firm prefers to stay where it is. One of the
costs of this arrangement to patients can be measured in additional miles driven for two
populations: additional patients who choose the higher-level hospital ex ante, and a smaller
subset of patients from elsewhere in the market whose infants are transferred to the high
level facility.
I can compute the average distance driven to hospitals under any market configura-
tion. This is accomplished by measuring the distance from the zip-code centroid to whatever
hospital is chosen for each person in the zip code. Aggregating up over the whole market
permits measurement of the average distance driven by everyone. Average distances are
both not very large initially and do not vary much when configurations are changed. This
is because most patients live in urban areas which are compact and hospitals frequently are
centrally located. When levels are changed, only a fraction of patients choose different facil-
ities, the additional distance they travel is not that great, so the average distance traveled
over the whole market does not change very much. For example, forcing all hospitals but
one in the entire Austin market to exit increases the average population-weighted distance
13In Neonatal Intensive Care, Florida (which has strict CON controls) employs an explicit formula and
targets bed numbers regionally on that basis, see [2], p. 11
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County / City N Average Distance
Travis / Austin 7 14.6
Harris / Houston 30 8.7
Bexar / San Antonio 10 14.45
Dallas / Dallas 16 10.0
Tarrant / Fort Worth 11 12.2
El Paso / El Paso 6 10.9
Table 1.19: Average Distances Driven by Market
County / City N
Equilibrium
Distance
Alternate
Distance
Travis / Austin 7 14.6 15.8
Harris / Houston 30 8.7 8.9
Bexar / San Antonio 10 14.45 14.35
Dallas / Dallas 16 10.0 10.3
Tarrant / Fort Worth 11 12.2 11.8
El Paso / El Paso 6 10.9 10.7
Table 1.20: Average Distances Driven by Market Under Different Configurations
traveled by about one mile. The population-weighted average distance to a hospital in Hous-
ton assuming that all individuals choose among their ten closest options is 11 miles. Values
are recorded for several large metro areas in Table (1.19).
Under alternative configurations, average distances traveled barely change. Addi-
tional patients do choose to go to the higher-level NICU, but the additional distance they
travel is not so great. In Table (1.20) I show the distances traveled under the prevailing
market conditions and distances traveled under one market arrangement with centralized
service provision.
Note that Table (1.19) suggests that average distances traveled (on a population-
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Market
Maximum NICU Admits -
Any Month 2005-2012
Highest Annual Monthly Average
2005 - 2012 Largest NICU
Bexar 357 309 94
Dallas 352 301 91
El Paso 162 130 20
Harris 616 565 118
Tarrant 297 262 62
Travis 167 144 67
Table 1.21: Max NICU Admits in Any Month, 2005 - 2012
weighted basis) are low in all metro areas. They stay low when NICU services are centralized.
What this suggests is that extremely implausible travel costs must be assumed to make the
welfare change from this change negative overall.
1.8.2.4 Relaxed Merger Enforcement
For this counterfactual, I suppose that pairs of hospitals merge, but consolidate their
facilities. That is, I suppose that all VLBW infants who show up at one facility are transferred
to the other. The combined facility then benefits from the volume of patients showing up
at each separately. As described above, this is quite a reasonable assumption within urban
areas: distances are small and the duration of labor is long. I do not observe mergers in the
data and cannot identify parameters relevant to determine when and why they occur, so I
specify the merging firms, rather than permitting firms to endogenously choose their merger
partners. The absence of any price observations is a limitation in this exercise, but with that
in mind, I do keep track of the willingness to pay of the merged firm.
In the following table, I report the results for several large Texas counties under an
exogenously given merger specification. The results are consistent with what one might ex-
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Year Mean NICU Size (Beds) SD Minimum Maximum
1990 15 11 2 60
1992 17 11 1 60
1994 17 13 2 72
1996 16 12 1 72
1998 19 14 2 60
2000 20 14 2 60
2002 20 15 2 68
2004 22 17 2 76
2006 22 18 2 90
2008 24 21 4 92
2010 25 21 3 94
2012 24 21 2 118
Table 1.22: Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum NICU Beds, 1990 - 2012
pect given the symmetric treatment of hospital NICUs: mortality declines as facility volume
increases due to consolidation. Merging two hospitals allows the merged facility to realize the
mortality gains associated with the combined volume of the two facilities. In expectation,
this saves several lives annually. The specific identities of the merging firms do not matter,
given the symmetric treatment of all NICUs. Distances traveled increase only slightly, as in
Table (1.20). Mergers do increase pricing power and travel distances, but likely not to the
extent that the next welfare change is negative. A proxy for the change in pricing power can
be derived from the change in the WTP of patients for the merged firm’s services. That is
reported in percentage terms in the last column of Table (1.23). Even supposing that the
prices the firms charge increase in the same percentage as the change in WTP, prices are not
so high that the net welfare effect is negative.
This suggests a different regulatory concern with respect to mergers in markets where
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Market
Sum of Pre-
Merger Mortalities
Mortality
Post-Merger
WTP % Change
Rel. to Max Prior
Travis / Austin 15 11 13%
Bexar / San Antonio 17 11 29.4%
Harris / Houston 17 13 54%
Tarrant / Fort Worth 16 12 23.8%
Dallas / Dallas 19 14 54.7%
El Paso / El Paso 20 14 58.4%
Table 1.23: Pre-merger and Post-merger Mortality in Large Markets
quality is increasing in consumer volume. Firms claim increased efficiencies and lower costs,
but firms and regulators should also consider the possibility of quality improvements. Mov-
ing down the curve in quarterly patients admitted to the NICU in Figure (2.1) cuts the
probability of mortality by two thirds. Ultimately, the positive effects on quality may be
even more important than the efficiencies gained through cost reduction.
1.8.2.5 Unmodeled Features
Two unmodeled feature of the present counterfactual are (1) the potential for con-
gestion in a high-demand service under entry restrictions and (2) the endogeneity of hospi-
tal/doctor effort.
To put the first problem another way, how large does a hypothetical single NICU
have to be in Houston to handle the volume of patients at its highest? As noted earlier,
most facilities in most months do not approach their capacity constraints. This would likely
be different under strict CON regulation. Admissions evidence suggests that most facilities
are not very close to their capacity constraints. Table (1.21) lists the maximum number of
admitted in any given month, the highest monthly average admits in a county over the years
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2005 - 2012 and the largest NICU in the county.
The endogeneity of doctor’s effort is a more important problem. Producing quality
outcomes takes an inputs of patients, as argued above, but it also takes effort by the doctors
themselves. The incentives for a monopoly provider of NICU services to exert effort might
be considerably reduced by strict CON regulation of entry. The optimal regulatory response
to the volume effects in large markets is probably a small oligopoly of competing facilities,
rather than a single monopoly provider.
1.9 Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper attempts to understand the incentives for hospital invest-
ment in advanced technologies and the resulting consequences for aggregate welfare in a
market characterized by increasing returns to quality in consumer volume. In my context,
the results suggest that considerable savings in lives can be realized from centralizing services
and/or restricting further entry into the market. This is, moreover, not likely to come at a
high cost in patient welfare due to increased costs of travel, since almost all of the volume
of patient deliveries (and so almost all of the volume of very-low birth weight infants) is
concentrated in a relatively small group of highly populated urban areas with many hospi-
tals where travel distances are already low. Population-weighted average distances traveled
barely change under a variety of market arrangements. Implausibly large per-mile travel
costs are required to outweigh the additional costs due to increased mortality. The market
power gained by restricting hospital investment in this service area to a few firms is substan-
tial, however, as shown by the increase in the HHI. This will affect the distribution of surplus
between the patient’s insurer and the hospital itself, and some of the increase in costs will
60
be passed through to the patient herself.
Free entry into this market has an unexpected and high cost. While the inability
to observe prices charged is an important limitation of the data available, the expected in-
crease in mortality due to decreased patient volumes across facilities likely swamps all of
the potential gains due to lower prices from increased hospital competition. The key feature
of this market: that conditional on staff and technologies, the patients themselves are a
crucial input to the learning by doing process for which no substitutes exist, suggests that
regulators should take a different attitude towards entry regulation. Rather than considering
entry something which is inevitably good, a full accounting of the costs and benefits of entry
requires recognizing and weighing the costs of decreased patient volume and the increased
mortality which results. The results in this market suggest that entry restrictions are war-
ranted, that mergers may have positive effects beyond increased efficiencies and that, on the
whole, competition among facilities for these patients has negative consequences.
1.10 Appendix
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Figure 1.4: State Certificate of Need Legislation
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Figure 1.14: Intensives in 2012
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Chapter 2
Volume Outcome Relationships in Texas Neonatal
Intensive Care
2.1 Introduction
Studies of the impact of surgical or procedure volume on the quality of outcome are
numerous across a wide array of medical procedures. [88] consider the question in the context
of neonatal intensive care in California and finds that infants treated in the highest-volume
and highest-level facilities in the state have a significantly (in the statistical and economic
sense) lower probability of mortality. The current paper takes a similar approach to the
question using Texas data, but I extend the work of Phibbs and coauthors using new data
and several different approaches to recover an underlying causal effect. Existing work on this
question both in the context of neonatal intensive care (and more broadly in other areas of
medicine) suggests that there are important positive effects on the quality of outcomes which
result from being treated at a NICU in a hospital which admits large numbers of patients to
the NICU.
The leading explanation for these effects in the medical literature is that learning by
doing occurs at the hospital level. Doctors and who see more patients understand better the
complexities involved in treating them. This is naturally plausible to those who work in the
field, but is also supported by empirical evidence from other work on learning. An equally
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important effect which evidence in this paper suggests is at work here is organizational
forgetting. When doctors and nurses do not see as many patients, their skills degrade and
the mortality rate increases. Patient volume not only matters, but needs to be consistent to
ensure that knowledge gained by experience does not depreciate. Organizational forgetting
is the subject of several studies, including [17] and [35]. [64] study the effects on mortality
at the individual-doctor level of a doctor’s absence from the operating room, whether due to
days off or extended vacations, and find that being away from the operating room raises the
likelihood of mortality for the patients who see the doctor after she returns. This suggests
that it is important to make sure that doctors see sufficiently many patients on an ongoing
basis.
This question is of central importance, especially to the population of very low birth
weight infants (< 1500 grams at birth). Very low birth weight infants account for roughly
1.5% of all infants born every year, but more than 50% of all infant deaths annually in the
United States. Nearly all are admitted to NICU’s at birth and generally form a substantial
fraction of those admitted. About 55% of all patients admitted to NICU’s in Texas are low
birth weight (< 2500 grams), while 16.5% are very low birth weight. Lowering the mortality
rate by a significant amount for this population has the potential to generate huge welfare
gains, given that each additional life saved counts at the full value of a statistical life. A
beneficial side effect would be to lower the infant mortality rate in the US, which lags rather
far behind that of most other advanced economies.
The current paper adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, by employing
IV techniques to control for the endogeneity of patient volume, I am able to more credibly
estimate the causal effect of volume on outcome. Second, the data I employ permits me
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to make more precise inferences about the timing of the volume of patients admitted to
each NICU than has been possible in previous literature. Specifically, I can condition on
the volume of patients admitted in the previous month since I observe all patients who are
admitted plus any transfers.
Also, using monthly observations on the month of birth permits me to compute a
measure of the stock of accumulated experience at the level of a single facility, including
both patients who were admitted at birth and who were transferred in. This permits me to
answer two questions. First, how important is more vs. less recent lagged volume in reducing
the mortality rate? Second, if more recent volume is more important than more temporally
distant lagged volume, what is the implied depreciation rate of the stock of accumulated
knowledge? This is key to addressing whether forgetting exists in this setting and, if so,
what the magnitude of the effect is.
Additionally, in this paper I attempt to infer the underlying distribution of unobserved
quality of the hospital, given the observed choice and mortality data. I follow [53], who
employ Bayesian methods using data on hospital admissions for pneumonia in hospitals in
Los Angeles County.
For a preview of the results, consider the plot in Figure (2.1). In this figure, I plot
the effect of volume on patient mortality from a probit including facility and year fixed
effects, where all other variables are evaluated at their mean values in the sample. The
y-axis records the probability of death as lagged one-quarter patient volume varies across
the x-axis. The range of patient volumes is chosen to be the 5th through 95th percentiles
of quarterly NICU admissions in Texas. What is immediately visible from the graph is that
the effects of additional volume in the previous month lowers the probability of mortality.
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The two lines show the effect of volume on outcome with and without corrections for the
endogeneity of patient volume, but the conclusion is the same in both settings: higher volume
facilities produce better outcomes for patients. With the IV results, it is possible to express
greater confidence that the effect is truly causal, rather than merely the result of selective
referral.
I further investigate the way that these effects change with time. I estimate a probit
model for mortality including 12 separate monthly lags, capturing an entire year’s lagged
volume. I find that the importance of lagged monthly volume to subsequent mortality
outcomes declines rapidly with time. Almost all of the effect is driven by the most recent
two months, while later months appear to have no impact at all on the quality of the outcome.
This suggests that the rate of depreciation of knowledge in NICU’s is quite high. I estimate
rates of knowledge depreciation which are substantially higher than those found in [17]’s
study of the production of airplanes.
The consequences for total patient mortality from moving all infants in the state
from facilities at the lower end of the volume distribution to the highest are large. The
total number of patients admitted to NICUs in the lowest quarter of the patient volume
distribution annually is around 6,000, of which 120 die annually. The estimation of the effect
of volume on outcome suggests that some fraction of these patients could potentially be saved
if they were initially sent to higher volume facilities. For example, taking all patients across
all Texas counties and sending them to the highest volume facilities in their counties would
say an estimated 146 lives annually. Valuing each statistical life at $7,000,000, which is a
median given existing estimates (see [117]) leads to a total welfare gain of $1,000,000,000.
Those gains are quite substantial. Concentrating the increase in volume across neighboring
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counties (e.g., transferring from suburban to urban hospitals) would increase this figure even
more.
Overall, the conclusion I draw is that there are likely “too many” NICU’s in Texas.
While competition among hospitals may lower prices and increase the convenience of access
for patients who are able to visit new NICU’s closer to their homes, the fact that the volume
of patients needing the service in the state is roughly fixed from year to year means that
most NICU’s in the state operate at low volumes. (For direct measurements of capacity
utilization, please see [15].) Lower patient volumes result in higher mortality rates than
could be achieved with fewer facilities. Patients in the aggregate would be better off driving
longer distances to one of a smaller number of facilities than they are in the current market
equilibrium.
An outline of the rest of the paper follows. In Section II, I cover the related literature
on studies of volume on the quality of outcome, on learning by doing and organizational
forgetting, and on Bayesian estimation of firm-specific quality. In Section III, I provide
some brief background about Neonatal Intensive Care Units and the populations which they
serve. Section IV briefly reviews the data. Section V covers the estimation of the volume-
outcome relationship with and without an instrument for patient volume, while section VI
covers two approaches to estimating a forgetting rate. Section VII includes a Bayesian
analysis of hospital-specific quality. Section VIII covers the policy implications and welfare
consequences. Section IX concludes.
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Figure 2.1: Partial Effects of Volume on Mortality Probability
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2.2 Related Literature
Studies of volume and outcome in the context of medical care are numerous. For a
broad survey of results across different procedures, see [83]. Evidence exists across procedures
suggesting that higher volume facilities produce better quality outcomes. Achieving credible
identification of these effects is difficult, due to the endogeneity of patient volume. [69]
outlines some of the difficulties in studying this question credibly. Nevertheless, the existing
literature is large and suggests that effects run from volume to outcomes. Most of the papers
in this literature do not address the underlying mechanisms at work. For a systematic review
of work on that subject, see [76]. [63] is an example from the economics literature of a study
of the benefits of regionalization - concentrating particular procedures into a smaller number
of facilities.
Neonatal intensive care units can be divided into levels, generally numbered 1- 3, with
3 being the most sophisticated. There are at least two channels of interest in studies of infant
mortality in the context of neonatal intensive care. First, there is a literature on the level
of the facility to which an infant is admitted. Certain infants who would benefit from being
treated in the highest possible level NICUs end up in lower-level facilities, perhaps due to a
lack of information on the part of their mothers about the relevant differences among hos-
pitals. This becomes more likely and more frequent as the number of lower-level (i.e., Level
2) facilities increases. This has been documented in [88] in the case of California. Whether
due to insufficient information or some other factor, parents or doctors do not immediately
transfer very low birth weight infants to the highest level facilities. As a result, mortality is
higher than it should be among patients who remain in Level 2 facilities. Two further exam-
ples of this literature are [42] and [8], who come to somewhat different conclusions about the
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County Total Births Total LBW Total VLBW % LBW % VLBW
Travis Mean 21055 1745 349 8.3 1.6
St. Dev. 1000 35.6 21 0.29 0.13
Bexar Mean 30274 2959 525 9.9 1.7
St. Dev. 749.5 92 32.5 0.18 0.08
Harris Mean 74916 6857 1324 9.15 1.8
St. Dev. 2728 333.6 68 0.15 0.06
Texas Mean 404,259 34,264 5915 8.4 1.45
St. Dev. 9559 998 200 0.05 0.05
Table 2.1: Mean Births, Low Birth Weight Births, Very Low Birth Weight Births in Several
Large Texas Counties, 2005 - 2010
importance of the level channel in California and Pennsylvania, respectively. The current
paper does not consider level effects in part because Level 2 facilities are less common in
Texas. I focus exclusively on volume effects (i.e., the effect of being admitted to a higher
volume facility, conditional on a level) rather than level effects.
The issue in this paper is that of patient volume at a given facility, rather than
patients sorting into ‘incorrect’ facilities. Related literature in this area includes [88], [65],
[66], [89]. The papers cited are all supportive of the idea that higher volumes lead to better
quality outcomes, though none of them attempt to correct for the endogeneity of volume. I
do in this paper using an instrumental variables strategy. [13] is a related paper looking at
the impact of the diffusion of managed care on mortality rates in this market and investment
in this service area by hospitals.
The instrument strategy I use is employed in [54] and in [45]. A related approach
involving predicting HHI is employed in [68], though those authors do not use their generated
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HHI measure to instrument for actual HHI. Those authors compute a predicted HHI across
markets using observed patient shares at the zip code level, weighted by the importance of
those shares to the hospital overall. Those authors do not use their measure to instrument
for HHI, which is endogenous to firm conduct.
There is a literature on forgetting within organizations and its effect on outcomes. One
of the best known papers in this literature is [17] who studies rates of forgetting in airplane
production. He finds about a 4% monthly depreciation rate of the stock of accumulated
knowledge. This is a similar rate to that estimated by [108], who studies forgetting in
the production of Liberty ships during World War II. [107] and [110] study learning in
the context of this same production environment. [64] and [35] study forgetting in the
context of medical care. [64] study within-surgeon effects of time out of the operating
room on patient mortality after patients return, while [35] study forgetting in the context
of emergency medical care. [35] estimate about a 10% depreciation rate for the stock of
accumulated knowledge every month. [33] find nearly full monthly depreciation of the stock
of knowledge in pizza franchises. Observed rates of depreciation vary widely depending on
the exact setting and method used. Rates of depreciation may be overestimated due to data
limitations, especially job separation rates within an organization, which is a point made by
[35].
Bayesian estimation of this type of model follows [53]. Employing a probit model
of hospital choice with a data augmentation approach originally due to [3], [53] recover the
underlying distribution of unobserved hospital quality. The posterior distribution which
results from a discrete choice probit model was intractable prior to the application of the
data augmentation approach in [3]. For a thorough discussion of the application of the Gibbs
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sampler to these problems, see both [50] and [49]. For a general overview, [27].
2.3 Industry Background
Neonatal intensive care units are distinguished by levels. Level I units are general
obstetrics wards which do not provide any advanced services to sick infants, though can sta-
bilize patients for transfer elsewhere. Level II units provide services beyond what are offered
at Level I facilities, but do not perform surgery on neonates and do not offer mechanical
ventilation of unlimited duration. (Many extremely premature infants are born with under-
developed lungs, so infants born at Level II units must be transferred if they need artificial
ventilation for an extended period of time.) Level III units are more advanced and less
restricted than Level II units: they provide mechanical ventilation of unlimited duration,
surgery for neonates and a wide range of advanced services for those in need. These defi-
nitions come directly from Texas’ Department of State Health Statistics Annual Survey of
Hospitals, administered jointly with the well-known Annual Survey of the American Hospital
Association. Definitions are consistent across years.
The majority of patients who are admitted to NICU’s at birth are admitted due to
prematurity/low birth weight. Patients admitted to the NICU are generally born earlier and
at lower birth weight than those not admitted. Differences among the population of patients
admitted to the NICU vs. those not are in Tables (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4).
Empirical work on the effects of patient volume on quality suggest that the negative
externality in production is large: on the order of a 20% increase in mortality from cutting
volumes at a high-level facility in half ([88]). The volume of patients needing intensive care
services (including low and very-low birth weight infants) in a hospital referral region is
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roughly fixed from year to year. Perhaps 8-9% of all infants will be low or very-low birth
weight, for example, while the number of infants needing sophisticated treatment of other
serious conditions is generally small. Table 2.1 contains counts of very low birth weight
infants for four of the largest counties in the state between 2005 and 2010. The last row
reports the values for the state as a whole (including the top three rows). Both the number
and standard deviations of very low birth weight infants are low: out of 400,000 births in the
state per year, around 6,000 infants will be very low birth weight, but the standard deviation
of the size of that population is only 200 patients per year. The entry of an additional NICU
and subsequent redistribution some of the volume from existing facilities to the new entrant
may result in lower average volumes everywhere. Fewer opportunities to treat patients are
available and skills degrade with time. This makes the outcomes for all patients worse,
including those in both the new hospital and the existing hospital.
In Table (2.2), t-tests of the difference in mean values for several different variables
measured at birth across those admitted and not admitted to the NICU. It is immediately
clear that there are important differences across several variables. Birth weight among those
admitted to the NICU vs. those not admitted differs by about 800 grams, or about 31% of
the average for the population admitted. The difference is highly significant. Gestational age
differs by about 3.5 weeks between the two populations: those admitted to the NICU spend
on average almost a month less in the womb. Maternal weight gain differs by about half a
pound, maternal age by about half a year and the number of prenatal visits by just over half
a visit. While all differences are statistically significant, the birth weight and gestational age
variable differences are large enough to make a meaningful difference in outcomes.
The differences by race follow the expected pattern. African-American mothers are
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Diff St.D. Mean All N Mean NICU N
Birth Weight 800.828 1.200 3321.96 2850162 2521.13 230853
Maternal Weight Gain 0.496 0.047 34.52 2850162 34.02 230853
Gestational Age 3.450 0.007 38.91 2850162 35.46 230853
Maternal Age -0.408 0.013 27.63 2850162 28.04 230853
Adeq. Pren. Care -0.676 0.041 15.16 2850162 15.83 230853
5 Min. APGAR 0.353 0.014 9.30 2850162 8.94 230853
Observations 3081015
Table 2.2: Differences Across Infants Admitted to NICU vs. Not, 2010 NCHS Data
Diff St.D. Frac. All N Frac. NICU N
Black -0.053 0.001 0.141 2850162 0.194 230853
White 0.049 0.001 0.773 2850162 0.724 230853
Asian 0.005 0.000 0.056 2850162 0.051 230853
Observations 3081015
Table 2.3: Racial Differences in NICU Admission Rates
known to have lower birth weight infants at a higher rate and to suffer higher rates of infant
mortality. The underlying causal mechanisms are the subject of active research. But as
expected here, African-American infants are admitted to the NICU at higher rates than
Asian or White infants as is readily visible in Table (2.3). With respect to health status,
as expected infants who are admitted to the NICU are in worse health than those who are
not. Across all of the conditions in Table (2.4), the fraction of patients having a condition
is much higher conditional on NICU admission than it is conditional on non-admission.
Investment in NICU’s is restricted in many states by Certificate of Need programs.
States with these requirements designate certain hospitals to provide high level services for
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Diff Z St.D. Frac. All N Frac. NICU N
Gest. Diabetes -0.016 -90.502 0.000 0.006 2845850 0.022 229957
Gest. Hyperten. -0.070 -158.385 0.001 0.038 2845850 0.108 229957
Asst. Vent. -0.227 -529.406 0.001 0.024 2850162 0.251 230853
Asst. Vent > 6 hrs. -0.114 -543.929 0.001 0.001 2850162 0.115 230853
Adm. NICU -1.000 -1755.282 0.000 0.000 2850162 1.000 230853
Surfactants -0.049 -356.797 0.000 0.000 2850162 0.049 230853
Antibiotics -0.204 -665.038 0.001 0.005 2850162 0.209 230853
Seizures -0.003 -78.811 0.000 0.000 2850162 0.003 230853
Birth Inj. -0.001 -25.557 0.000 0.001 2850162 0.002 230853
Anencephaly -0.000 -10.647 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.000 227428
Spn. Bif. -0.002 -55.179 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.002 227428
Cy. Cong. Hrt. Dis. -0.006 -115.055 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.006 227428
Diaph. Hern. -0.001 -54.052 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.001 227428
Omphalocele -0.001 -41.384 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.001 227428
Gastroschisis -0.003 -92.783 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.003 227428
Limb Reduction -0.001 -22.011 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.001 227428
Cleft Lip -0.002 -34.018 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.002 227428
Cleft Palate -0.001 -32.610 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.001 227428
Hypospadias -0.001 -17.384 0.000 0.000 2845332 0.001 227428
Observations 3081015
Table 2.4: Differences Across Complicating Conditions
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Figure 2.2: Perinatal Regionalization in Georgia
an entire region. The perinatal regionalization system in Georgia is depicted in Figure (2.2).
Large blocks of counties are served by designated perinatal care centers, which are responsible
for assisting other facilities in the transport of sick neonates. In Georgia’s case, each region
is served by a single high-level facility. New York and Florida are two other large states
with perinatal regionalization systems, though they permit more high level facilities in large
cities.
In states without certificate of need control, hospitals have found neonatal intensive
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Figure 2.3: Number of Level 3 Facilities
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care to be a lucrative investment. In Texas, which is the subject of my paper [15], large
urban counties now generally have more Level III units than Level I units. These effects are
driven mostly by competitive pressures and business stealing incentives. In CON states, by
comparison, rates of observed investment are much, much lower. In Figure (2.3), I plot the
number of Level III facilities by year in two states with strong Certificate of Need control
(Florida and Georgia) and one state without it (Texas) for 1991 - 2014. As is immediately
visible, the number of facilities in CON states does not change much from year to year, while
in Texas it grows steadily over the time period of the survey.
The driving force for investment in Texas is the fact that providing this service is
very profitable. As I show in [15], adding an intensive care unit results in a substantial
increase in general patient volume to the obstetrics ward. Profit increases can come via two
channels: first, the ability to provide new, expensive services to a sick population, second, an
increase in patient volume from those who are not in need, but who choose to visit a hospital
out of a precautionary motive related to the possibility that they might need the service.
Observed investment behavior in Texas in Figure (2.3) suggests that it is very unlikely that
hospitals are losing substantial sums on investing in this service. If anything, Figure (2.3)
is understating the attractiveness of the investment and the competitive pressures hospitals
are subject to. Most of the new Level 3 units constructed in the state between 1990 and 2012
are built in urban areas which are already well-served by NICUs. Access does not expand
spatially. More details are available in [15].
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2.4 Data
The data consist of the universe of infants admitted to neonatal intensive care units in
Texas at birth, plus all of those who were low birth weight (2500 g) or less, plus all neonatal
deaths (28 days or fewer). The data cover 381 unique facilities and eight years. Over the
whole period of the data, the characteristics of the population are relatively stable. There
are between 43,000 - 46,000 patients in the three groups per year. Nearly all (more than
99%) are born in hospitals. They tend to be premature - mean estimated weeks of gestation
is around 35 (see Table (2.2) for a comparison to those not admitted to a NICU at birth).
One characteristic which does change over time is the insurance status of the population,
where “self-pay” declines and “Medicaid” increases Summary statistics concerning the data
are in Table 2.5.
Data for the whole population of newborns in Texas is available for 2005 - 2010 using
data from the National Center for Health Statistics. This data includes information on the
complete universe of births in Texas every year. It also includes additional information about
each patient in the state who died within one year. Summary measures are in Table (2.6).
The comparisons in Tables (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are all made using this data. The national
data includes more covariates and much more detailed information than are available in the
Texas birth certificate data, but that dataset does not include any information about the
hospital of birth, which is crucial to determining the level and volume of patients treated at
the NICU.
For some of the entries in Table (2.6), I use the Texas Department of State Health
Statistics (DSHS) Inpatient Public Use Data File. These files contain information on the
universe of discharges from all hospitals in the state annually, except a small number which
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either very small counties or which provide specialized services. The latter category includes
specialty children’s hospitals, which is an important data limitation, as these children’s
hospitals are present in the birth certificate data. The largest metro areas in the state each
have at least one specialty children’s hospital. To compute patient distances to their chosen
hospitals, I use information on the mother’s zip code of residence at the time of birth. (This
is available for more than 90% of all births in the inpatient data file.) I measure distances
from the center of the zip code to the location of the hospital and report in Table (2.6) the
distribution of distances traveled.
The other source of data which I use is the Texas Department of State Health Services
Annual Survey of Hospitals ([104]). This survey provides a complete picture of hospitals in
the state. As with the Inpatient Public Use Data File, all but a very small number of
facilities in small counties, plus a small group of specialty hospitals, are required to complete
the survey every year. The survey is jointly administered with the better-known American
Hospital Association’s Annual Survey, which is a standard source of data widely used in
nearly all papers in this literature. The survey contains a wide range of variables covering
inpatient utilization, the existence of different services and facilities, plus some measures of
staffing and financial information. For this paper, I use DSHS’s survey for 2005-2012 to track
which hospitals in the data have Level 1, level 2, or level 3 NICU’s. The survey permits me
to observe entry, exit and level changes over time.
The patients admitted to NICU’s resemble the whole population on most dimensions.
As is to be expected given that prematurity is one of the leading causes of low birth weight,
there estimated gestational age is lower than that in the whole population by about three
weeks and the standard deviation in estimated gestational age is about double that in the
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Characteristic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Patients 43082 45338 46039 47132 48039 46647 45660 46400
Mortality Rate (/1000) 33.5 32.4 31.0 30.2 28.5 29.7 28.5 28.4
Percent Born in Hospital 99.7 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.5 99.6 99.6
Unique Hospitals 273 275 267 271 276 262 264 261
Fraction Male 0.508 0.506 0.505 0.510 0.509 0.508 0.510 0.510
Estimated Weeks Gestation 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
(S.D.) (4.5) (4.4) (4.5) (4.4) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2)
Birth Weight (grams) 2312 2313 2309 2328 2343 2369 2372 2390
(S.D.) (779) (783) (776) (773) (781) (788) (795) (820)
Transferred (%) 7.5 6.8 6.9 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.4 5.2
Distances Traveled
Average Distance Traveled 12.8 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.7
(S.D.) (14.6) (14.1) (14.1) (14.3) (13.8) (14.1) (14.5) (14.4)
Distance 5th Percentile 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
Distance 95th Percentile 38.1 36.8 36.7 37.6 37.0 36.8 37.7 37.7
Insurance Status
Medicaid 43.6 43.7 43.8 46.8 49.2 50.2 50.4 48.8
Private 37.6 35.9 36.6 36.8 35.7 35.4 35.8 36.0
Self-pay 13.9 16.9 14.4 10.7 9.0 8.3 7.3 7.5
Other/Unknown 4.8 3.51 5.2 5.75 6.1 6.2 6.5 7.7
Table 2.5: NICU Admit Sample Characteristics
whole population. The patients in the NICU admissions sample have a much higher mortality
rate, which again is to be expected.
2.5 Estimation
2.5.1 Probit Estimation of Mortality
I estimate a mortality probit equation as a function of lagged hospital volume. The
outcome y∗i is 1 if patient i is recorded to have died. I consider only patients in the data who
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Characteristic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients 392,222 405,879 414,170 412,147 408,391 392,764
Mortality Rate (/1000) 6.13 5.96 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.7
Percent Born in Hospital 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7
Unique Hospitals 290 289 287 286 276 285
Fraction Male 0.512 0.511 0.511 0.512 0.510 0.510
Estimated Weeks Gestation 38.1 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.2 38.3
(S.D.) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (2.2) (2.1) (2.1)
Birth Weight (grams) 3244 3235 3232 3227 3223 3226
(S.D.) (585) (587) (581) (582) (582) (578)
Percent LBW 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.4
Percent VLBW 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
Distances Traveled
Average Distance Traveled 10.9 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.0
(S.D.) (11.7) (11.5) (11.5) (11.7) (11.7) (11.7)
Distance 5th Percentile 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82
Distance 95th Percentile 31.3 31.3 31.1 31.5 31.5 31.4
Insurance Status
Medicaid 43.6 43.7 43.8 46.8 49.2 50.2
Private 37.6 35.9 36.6 36.8 35.7 35.4
Self-pay 13.9 16.9 14.4 10.7 9.0 8.3
Other/Unknown 4.8 3.51 5.2 5.75 6.1 6.2
Table 2.6: All Texas Births - Population Characteristics, 2005 - 2010
94
are admitted to the NICU.
y∗i = α + βXi + γvh +
∑
w
ψw +
∑
t
φt +
∑
s
pis + δ1wt<1500g. + i (2.1)
yi = 1y∗i>0 (2.2)
The parameter of interest is γ on the lagged patient volume measure vh. Across
different specifications I control for individual health states Xi, gestational age ψw (closely
correlated with birth weight), year fixed effects φt, patient insurance status pis, and a lagged
hospital-specific volume term vh recording NICU admits for the prior quarter. I include an
indicator for whether the patient is very low birth weight.
One concern with the previous model is that hospital volume is likely endogenous
to an underlying and unobserved quality parameter. The choice of hospital is best thought
of as the joint choice of patients and their doctors, a point made in [62]. Patients (and
especially their doctors) know more about the differences among hospitals in any market
than the econometrician does. They are therefore likely to endogenously refer patients to
unobservably better hospitals. This means that hospital volume is correlated with the error
term i in Equation (2.1).
If doctors know more about hospitals and the variations in quality among them than
the econometrician, they would likely arrange for sicker patients to be admitted to higher
quality hospitals where they will receive better care. What is worth noting is that this
selective referral pattern likely biases us against finding any positive effect of volume on the
quality of outcome. Specifically, unobservably higher quality facilities are being sent sicker
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Distance to Chosen -.1350956 -.1401679 -.1386198 -.1383008 -.1372531 -.1378965
.0007721 .0007772 .0007738 .0007489 .0007386 .0007476
Distance Squared .0003868 .0003983 .0003936 .000397 .0003966 .0003985
2.92e-06 2.92e-06 2.95e-06 2.83e-06 2.89e-06 2.89e-06
Level 3 1.076136 1.115735 1.053772 1.34836 1.297681 1.146061
.0190674 .019926 .0202007 .0224778 .0228856 .0227744
Level 2 .1565831 .2360021 .1646441 .3788195 .4394275 .2950157
.0259654 .0261861 .02492 .0253428 .0279101 .0285319
Obstetrics Level 1 1.950811 2.075353 1.795612 2.075757 1.803341 2.047937
.0325649 .0321277 .0309018 .030969 .0303161 .032197
Obstetrics Level 2 2.452112 2.512113 2.369475 2.2748 2.116337 2.373674
.0329725 .0326112 .0310458 .0322187 .0311317 .0334697
Obstetrics Level 3 3.172436 3.185297 3.096666 2.793922 2.728546 2.96591
.034387 .0343069 .0325804 .0335424 .0326682 .0349757
N 43,960 46,372 46,952 47,997 48,986 47,395
Table 2.7: Estimated Choice Models by Year
patients. Their patient volumes increase, but this same population of patients has a higher
probability of mortality than normal. The hospital-specific mortality rate will be lower, since
the composition of patients is sicker than the population average. That is, the most obvious
selection-into-facilities story suggests that we should find no effect, or that the true effects
is likely to be larger than the naively measured version here. At the same time, the effect
on unobservably worse facilities runs in the opposite direction: as doctors send sick patients
away from lower-quality facilities, the average mortality risk of patients who remain is better
(they are at lower risk of dying) and the volume at the facility is lower.
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2.5.2 Instrumenting for Volume
To solve this problem, I instrument for hospital volume v, following a procedure due
to [54], [44] and [45]. These authors estimate patient choice models for hospital features
as a function of observable features of the hospital, features of the patient (e.g., patient
demographics), and features of the hospital-patient pair (e.g., distance). Using this model,
I predict patient choice probabilities and aggregate them across all of the patients in the
data to generate expected hospital patient shares. Hospitals which serve densely populated
areas or which offer more desirable services (e.g., higher level facilities) will have a higher
expected volume than those which lack these features. Hospital level fixed effects are not
included, since these would include unobserved hospital-specific quality. This model captures
only those features which are observable and do not depend on unobserved hospital quality.
The predicted volume measure, therefore, is a function only of observable characteristics of
patients and hospitals, not the underlying unobserved quality measure.
I do not constrain patient choices by existing market definitions, whether within a
county, or within state Public Health Regions (groups of 10-15 counties). I permit each
patient to have a very wide range of possible choices: I permit choice among the 50 closest
hospitals in the state. This permits a very wide range of choices. Very few patients choose
hospitals which are that distant from their homes. In the average quarter, I observe fewer
than 50 patients out of 85,000 choosing the 50-th hospital. In fact, fewer than 50 patients
choose any hospital between 45 - 50th closest. This is in part because these facilities are
generally quite far away: the 50th closest hospital is on average about 60 miles from a
patient’s zip code of residence, with a large standard deviation (40 miles).
Actual hospital volume is correlated with this expected volume measure vˆ, but pre-
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dicted hospital volume vˆ does not otherwise enter into the mortality equation except via
v. Expected hospital volume is then correlated with actual hospital volume, but does not
directly enter into Equation (2.1). Furthermore, this volume measure is not a function of
unobserved hospital quality, because it is estimated as a function of hospital, patient and
patient-hospital observables only. With this in mind, I instrument for realized volume using
the predicted volume measure in Equation (2.4)
y∗i,h,t = α + βXi + γvh +
∑
w
ψw +
∑
t
φt +
∑
s
pis + δ1wt<1500g. + i (2.3)
vh = α
′ + β′Xi +
∑
w
ψ′w +
∑
t
φ′t +
∑
s
pi′s + γ
′vˆh + ′i (2.4)
yi = 1y∗i>0 (2.5)
Much of the variation in this instrument is driven by entry and exit among other
facilities. As other facilities enter, exit or change levels, the predicted volume will change
as existing facilities become relatively more or less attractive. I observe 54 changes in level
during over the time frame covered by the data representing 23 unique counties. This
understates the number of facilities exposed to a level change by a competitor, however.
The total number of hospitals across those 23 counties (not counting neighboring counties
which may plausibly considered to be in the same market) is 110, out of a total of about 350,
so the number who are potentially facing a demand shock due to the upgrade or downgrade
of a competitor is large as a fraction of the total. But this should be considered a lower
bound on the total, as most counties in Texas are quite small in area and most hospitals are
concentrated around the large urban areas.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No IV Vol. IV Vol. IV Vol. IV Vol. IV
Prev. Q. Vol. -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0002∗ -0.0002∗ -0.0002∗
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Medicaid 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
. . .
Private Insurance -0.0746∗∗∗ -0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0764∗∗∗
0.0168 0.0169 0.0173
Self-pay 0.2109∗∗∗ 0.2171∗∗∗ 0.2185∗∗∗
0.0226 0.0226 0.0234
Other 0.1581∗∗∗ 0.1593∗∗∗ 0.1450∗∗∗
0.0359 0.0360 0.0374
Unknown 0.1709 0.1794 0.1991
0.1189 0.1190 0.1220
VLBW=0 0.0000 0.0000
. .
VLBW=1 0.3829∗∗∗ 0.3648∗∗∗
0.0310 0.0317
Assisted Ventilation Immediately Following Delivery 0.1581∗∗∗
0.0171
Surfactant Replacement Therapy 0.1252∗∗∗
0.0302
Antibiotics for Suspected Neonatal Sepsis -0.1381∗∗∗
0.0225
Seizure or Serious Neurologic Dysfunction 0.9756∗∗∗
0.0789
Significant Birth Injury 0.5052∗∗∗
0.1247
Anencephaly 2.5848∗∗∗
0.1285
Meningomyelocele/Spina Bifida 0.3118∗
0.1590
Cyanotic Congenital Heart Disease 1.1402∗∗∗
0.0680
Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia 1.6850∗∗∗
0.1025
Omphalocele 1.2637∗∗∗
0.1507
Gastroschisis 0.3786∗∗∗
0.1078
Limb Reduction Defect 1.0958∗∗∗
0.1351
Hypospadias 0.4376∗∗
0.1519
Constant -1.6149∗∗∗ -1.6286∗∗∗ -1.6845∗∗∗ -1.8265∗∗∗ -1.8925∗∗∗
0.2686 0.2686 0.2691 0.2745 0.2775
Expected Volume 0.3163∗∗∗ 0.3112∗∗∗ 0.3112∗∗∗ 0.3079∗∗∗
0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
Medicaid 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
. . .
Private Insurance 28.3752∗∗∗ 28.3765∗∗∗ 28.0481∗∗∗
0.4444 0.4444 0.4371
Self-pay 17.7340∗∗∗ 17.7211∗∗∗ 17.4811∗∗∗
0.7250 0.7251 0.7139
Other -9.8589∗∗∗ -9.8645∗∗∗ -7.9603∗∗∗
1.1523 1.1523 1.1300
Unknown -39.9538∗∗∗ -39.9761∗∗∗ -45.2729∗∗∗
3.9631 3.9631 3.8884
VLBW=0 0.0000 0.0000
. .
VLBW=1 -1.4665 -3.1030∗∗
1.0153 0.9959
Assisted Ventilation Immediately Following Delivery 35.2196∗∗∗
0.4684
Surfactant Replacement Therapy 9.0547∗∗∗
1.0995
Antibiotics for Suspected Neonatal Sepsis 11.9608∗∗∗
0.5707
Seizure or Serious Neurologic Dysfunction -3.8932
4.0034
Significant Birth Injury -14.0082∗
5.5829
Anencephaly -0.1737
8.4286
Meningomyelocele/Spina Bifida -18.2393∗∗∗
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5.3480
Cyanotic Congenital Heart Disease -8.7594∗
3.5526
Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia -3.2879
6.5629
Omphalocele -6.7516
8.7698
Gastroschisis 1.5087
3.5998
Limb Reduction Defect -8.1513
7.3173
Hypospadias -4.5515
5.9899
Constant -54.3654∗∗∗ -60.5406∗∗∗ -60.1214∗∗∗ -75.2565∗∗∗
11.0475 10.9134 10.9172 10.7047
athrho2 1 -0.0474∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗ -0.0403∗∗∗ -0.0552∗∗∗
0.0103 0.0103 0.0104 0.0107
lnsigma2 4.4949∗∗∗ 4.4824∗∗∗ 4.4824∗∗∗ 4.4625∗∗∗
0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
IV No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance No No Yes Yes Yes
VLBW No No No Yes Yes
HealthStates No No No No Yes
ExogeneityPval 3.72e-06 .0000476 .0001017 2.35e-07
N 186611 186611 186611 186611 186611
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The key coefficient on volume in the previous quarter maintains the expected sign
across specifications, both with and without the IV for volume. The effect is negative and
significant. Furthermore, a Hausman test rejects the exogeneity of volume. The partial
effects are plotted in Figure (2.1). The key points to notice are: that mortality probability
is declining with the admissions in the prior quarter, that there is some limited evidence
to support a selective referral story, and that the confidence intervals around the point
estimates exclude any straight-line, constant mortality rate as a function of volume. The
selective referral story is compatible with that outlined at the beginning of the paper: it
appears that correcting for the endogeneity of volume does show that lower volume facilities
have unobservably healthier patients, while high volume patients have unobservably sicker
patients. This is consistent with a story in which doctors refer patients from low volume
facilities where care is unobservably worse, perhaps due to less learning by doing, to better
quality, higher volume facilities where it is better. The estimated effects are not consistent
with a story in which volume does not matter to the production of quality.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Annual Volume on Mortality Probability
The graph of the partial effects of volume on outcome are shown with confidence
intervals again in Figure (2.4). The figure shows the effects of volume on mortality probability
as annual volume is varied from the 5th - 95h percentile of observed values. This estimation
includes the IV for volume and includes hospital specific fixed-effects. The key point point
to take from the estimated partial effects and confidence intervals is that all straight lines
are excluded. A constant effect of patient volume on mortality is not consistent with the
data. While this estimation uses NICU admits in the prior year, a very similar graph would
result if the estimation were re-run using the volume of NICU patients in the prior quarter,
prior month, or several prior months.
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Furthermore, the effects are large. A reduction of 1% in mortality probability from
moving to the lowest to highest volume facilities is significant. I show the results of transfer-
ring all patients in the state from low volume to high volume facilities in Figure (2.5). The
total potential savings in lives over the entire state is nearly 150 infants annually.
2.6 Learning and Forgetting
The most plausible explanation for the effects of volume on outcome is that some
learning occurs at the level of the facility. Learning in the context of medical care has been
the subject of many papers, among then [64], [35], [54], [44] and [45]. The mechanism in this
context should be thought of as learning happening at the team level for several reasons.
First of all, average durations of stay in the NICU are long: about 13.2 days on average.
Patients are cared for over an extended period of time by a team of people. NICU’s are
supervised by neonatologists per state requirements, but most hour-to-hour management is
done by nurses. Unfortunately, no data is available about specific staff members present in
at any hospital. Informally, however, the mechanism at work should be thought of as one
where doctors and nurses get better at treating patients through practice. As time passes
and more patients pass through the NICU, staff improve their ability to predict what will
work to help each individual patient.
The following two short tables show the effects of lagged monthly and lagged quarterly
volume on the mortality probability for admits to Level III facilities. The lagged monthly
effect is more strongly negative than the lagged quarterly effect. In Table (2.10) I instrument
for monthly volume and in Table (2.9) for quarterly volume and include hospital fixed effects.
Due to the inclusion of the fixed effect, identification here comes from variation in hospital-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No IV Vol. IV Vol. IV Vol. IV Vol. IV
Prev. Q. Vol. -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0002∗ -0.0002∗ -0.0002∗
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
IV No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ins. No No Yes Yes Yes
VLBW No No No Yes Yes
Health States No No No No Yes
Hausman Test 3.31e-06 .0000426 .0000902 2.42e-07
N 185817 185817 185817 185817 185817
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.9: Prior Quarter Volume Effect on Mortality Probability
specific volume.
Including 12 lagged months both with and without facility fixed effects paints a similar
picture and suggests that there is an important role for forgetting in modeling the underlying
effects at work in this environment. In both Table (2.11) and Table (2.12), the most recent
lagged month has the strongest negative effect on the mortality rate. Even the second lagged
month, while still of the correct sign, is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Later
months have even wider confidence intervals and all include zero. The fact that the most
recent months matter and those in the more distant past do not suggests that forgetting
plays a significant role in the process.
The estimate coefficients all suggest that patient volume matters, but the month-
specific coefficients provide support to the idea that it is recent volume which matters more
than volume in the distant past. This suggests an important role for forgetting in this
market.
To examine these effects more carefully, I estimate two models of forgetting, one of
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(1) (2) (3)
Neonatal Death Neonatal Death Neonatal Death
Admits Pr. Month -0.0088∗ -0.0066 -0.0077
0.0044 0.0043 0.0044
IV Yes Yes Yes
Ins. Yes Yes No
FEs Yes Yes Yes
Time Mn. Mn. Mn.
Health States Yes No Yes
N 188445 188445 188445
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.10: Prior Month Volume Effect on Mortality Probability
which is similar to that estimated by [17] in his paper on forgetting in the production of
airlines.
2.6.1 Organizational Forgetting
To assess the depreciation rate of knowledge at the firm level, I estimate two nonlinear
models of the effects of lagged volume on the mortality outcome. In the first model, I assume
a strict geometric depreciation rate for lagged experience at the facility level. Past facility
experience is denoted Vi and is discounted by δ ∈ (0, 1). This regression includes patient-
specific health states (the same used in earlier specifications), hospital facility information
and a set of year dummies. (This model does not include hospital-specific fixed effects.) The
coefficient of interest is the δ1 which multiplies lagged hospital-specific experience. I include
12 lagged months of experience.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
δ1 0.5370 0.5367 0.5367 0.5367 0.5367
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Health States N N Y Y Y
Hospital Chars. N Y N Y Y
Ins. Stat. N Y Y N Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Table 2.13: Estimated Depreciation Rates
Mortalityi = β0 +
N∑
i=0
δN−i1 Vi + ΓXi + ΦXh + ΨΩt +  (2.6)
The estimated monthly depreciation rate in this model is extremely high: about 50%
of the stock of experience present at the beginning of the month has vanished by the end of
the month. Of the experience present at the beginning of a year, only 0.04% is present at
the end of the year. This holds across the several specifications. This estimate, while much
higher than that of [17] or [108], is lower than that in [33], who estimate forgetting rates in
pizza franchises.
The second specification I estimate treats all accumulated experience Et differently
from contemporaneous experience. This is the specification of [17] and other papers in the
literature, include [33]. In Benkard’s case, however, the estimated monthly depreciation rates
are much lower than those I estimate here. These rates are on the higher end of what has
been estimated in this literature. The model I estimate is follows:
Mortalityi = β0 + α log(δ2Et−1 + vt−1) + ΓXi + ΦXh + ΨΩt + 
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Cumulative experience is here defined as:
Et = δ2Et−1 + vt
This cumulative experience measure should be thought of as a reduced form for
the effect of prior experience (also the interpretation in [17]) . There are important data
limitations which prevent drawing stronger conclusions about the exact form of forgetting in
this context. As previously mentioned, patients will be treated over the course of their stays
by several nurses and the nurses will potentially be supervised by more than one doctor.
Nurse to patient ratios are generally quite low: perhaps one nurse to two or three patients,
but patients are monitored around the clock, so it is certain that they will be monitored by
more than one nurse over the course of a day. Given that the average duration of a stay is
nearly two weeks, it is also certain that a given patient will cycle through several providers.
The data is not informative about who is actually looking after which patients on any given
day, nor which doctors are present at the facility.
Therefore, while it is quite plausible given the institutional details to assume that
learning happens at the level of the team, delving more deeply into how that process actu-
ally works is not possible. There are potentially several processes which could be at work:
individual nurses may learn, but since they are responsible for small numbers of patients
perhaps the variety of cases they see is small. Doctors and nurses may better coordinate
care given time and experience. Nurses may become more effective at sharing information
across shifts. Several different possibilities can be contemplated.
Furthermore, attrition is potentially an important problem in this environment. The
108
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ2 0.091 0.049 0.057 0.067
(0.26) (0.142) (0.15) (0.2)
Health States N N Y Y
Hospital Chars. N Y N Y
Ins. Stat. N Y Y N
Year Y Y Y Y
Table 2.14: Estimated Depreciation Rates
rate at which nursing staff turns over is high. This is an issue which hospitals track and care
about since the costs of training new nursing staff are significant. When a nurse separates
from employment at a given hospital, the knowledge he has accumulated disappears with
him. Since separation rates are high but unobserved, this causes an overestimate of the
actual underlying rate of forgetting. On this issue in a different health care context, see
[35]. However, the underlying forgetting rate within an individual doctor or nurse, though of
independent interest, is not the relevant quantity here. If nurses separate from employment
in NICU’s and take their accumulated experience, and this raises the probability of mortality
within a facility, that is the relevant quantity for the purposes of this estimation and the
counterfactuals. Provided rates of nursing separation are similar across facilities and not
correlated with some other underlying unobservable related to mortality, this estimation
should be the relevant quantity.
The estimated forgetting rate in the second model is quite high, but the confidence
intervals are large enough to include zero in each specification. Again I include individual-
specific health states, hospital characteristics, a time trend and a constant. It is impossible to
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rule out full depreciation after one month with this model. That would be broadly consistent
with what I find above using the 12 separate lagged months in the probit model, with or
without hospital-specific fixed effects: the most recent month matters, while months earlier
do not seem to have a significant negative effect on mortality. It is also broadly consistent
with the first model of depreciation in Equation (2.6). Whether estimated as a probit with
separate month lags or with two separate non-linear models of depreciation, the estimated
forgetting rate is quite high.
2.7 Implications
The results from the probit estimation of volume on mortality suggest that substantial
savings in lives can be realized by transferring patients from the lowest volume to the highest
volume facilities in their market. Valuing each life saved at $7,000,000 suggests sizable gains
due to centralization.
I conduct the following experiment, the results of which are in Figure (2.5). For each
county in the state, I transfer all of the patients admitted to the NICU in the county to
the hospital with the highest NICU volume. I compute the mortality rate implied by that
volume of patients and then compute an expected mortality rate under the assumption of
centralization. I also compute the expected mortality rates implied by actual patient volumes
at the separate facilities to which patients were actually admitted. I plot the difference
between the expected patient deaths in the current market equilibrium vs. those in the
centralized market in Figure (2.5). The x-axis shows lives saved per county for the 20 or so
counties with populations over 250,000.
As is immediately visible from the graph, the savings in lives over the entire state are
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Figure 2.5: Lives Saved by Centralizing Patient Care
quite large. (The rightmost column is the entire state including the counties listed separately
to the left.) Nearly 150 lives could be saved under facility centralization, taking advantage
of the effects of learning by doing through volume and the attendant reductions in mortality.
Valuing each life lost at $7,000,000 per [117] suggests gains of slightly more than 1 billion
dollars annually just from centralizing patient care.
There are instructive examples outside the US context where care has been centralized
and outcomes improved, both in the context of perinatal care and outside it. For example,
[80] and [25] report on the results of a program of perinatal centralization begun in Portugal
in 1989. Hospitals with fewer than 1500 deliveries annually had their obstetrics wards closed,
intensive care units were added to higher-delivery-volume hospitals, a system of Level desig-
nation (matching the I-III system used here) was implemented, requirements for specialized
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staffing were imposed, a set of rules for referring patients to Level II and III centers created
and a national transportation network created.1 This system led to substantial improve-
ments in the infant mortality rate in Portugal. More importantly, the position of Portugal
relative to its European neighbors also improved substantially. In 1985, Portugal was an
infant mortality outlier, with a mortality rate of 18/1000 infants, against a 15-country Eu-
ropean average of about 10/1000 (and higher than any country in that group). By 2005, the
mortality rate had declined to below 4/1000. Portugal’s infant mortality rate in 2005 was
bested only by Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden, three much richer states. (The source for
the information in this paragraph is [81].)
For another instructive example in a case where transportation costs are an even
greater consideration, [77] report on the results of an experiment to centralize the provision
of stroke care in Manchester and London (separately). The number of hospitals in the greater
London area providing stroke care declined as a result of this centralization from 30 to eight.
Nevertheless, mortality declined in London at 3, 30 and 90 days. (Mortality was unaffected
in Manchester.) This is particularly impressive, given that time out of the hospital means
further brain death in the case of stroke. While labor and delivery can take multiple hours,
minutes of delay can lead to significant negative outcomes for stroke patients. This makes
the improvement in mortality from centralizing stroke care more impressive.
Both of these examples suggest that these policies can be implemented successfully
and that they can make an important difference. The gains from centralization are substan-
tial. Not considered in the present paper are several countervailing effects, some of which are
1Portugal is a small country, but the national perinatal system includes air transportation for patients
from Madeira and the Azores, two island chains which are 500 and 850 miles from the mainland, respectively.
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relevant only in the US context. Portugal and the UK both have national health insurance
schemes: there is no role for negotiation between hospitals and insurers and there is no reason
to worry about firm market power. Permitting only one firm to offer this highly-desirable
service in the US context would give that firm substantial bargaining power in negotiations
with insurers. It is possible that the firm’s bargaining power would be high enough to extract
all of this surplus. Furthermore, requiring each patient who needs this service to drive to
a single hospital may increase traveling distances in some markets. The policy effects are
considered at length in [15]. What I find there is that, at least for the issue of the costs of
travel, the implied price per mile of additional distance has to be implausibly large (e.g., on
the order of $10,000 per mile for the Austin market) to make this change welfare neutral.
Another policy option which I discuss in [15] is the possibility that the regulator should
simply regulate the price of this service directly. If there is no substitute - conditional on
staffing and available technology - for actually treating patients in the learning process, then
a regulator may overlook the increase in market power that comes from being a monopoly
provider of a service. However, this does not mean the regulator must sit passively while
a hospital charges a monopoly price for the service. Prices can themselves be subject to
regulation.
National health insurance schemes internalize this process, but there is an instructive
example in the US from Maryland. [58] describes this program in great detail and is the
source for the following information. The essential point is that Maryland regulates hospital
charges across all payer types. This system has been in operation since the 1970’s. In recent
years the state has actually set total revenue for all hospitals in the state, computed relative
to revenues in a base year, allowing for certain increases. Any adjustments and rates of
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growth in this number are also set by the state’s Health Services Cost Review Commission.
Hospital charges for particular services are set by the commission so that the expected
revenues across service types given expected patient volumes add up to the global budget.
The public payers are permitted a discount on charges relative to private payers, but this
discount is small (about 6%). Several university medical centers (University of Maryland and
several campuses of the Johns Hopkins system) are exempt from parts of this regulation, but
otherwise hospital prices at all of the roughly 50 hospitals in the are regulated in Maryland
on a much more stringent basis than in most other states in the US.
A regulator approaching this problem might view the idea of centralizing service
and restricting entry as a gift to the designated facility. Prices would likely end up being
higher due to the increase in bargaining power for this single hospital. However, prices are
observable and regulable. Quality in this setting is not. The production of quality requires
an extremely scarce input with an inelastic supply. (Obviously even if supply were elastic it
would not be welfare-improving to increase it!)
2.8 Conclusion
The results in this paper suggest an important role for volume in the production of
high-quality outcomes in the context of neonatal intensive care. Simply moving patients
treated in the lowest volume NICU’s to the highest on a per-county basis would save 140
lives annually in Texas. This may well be an underestimate, as the model was estimated
on a set of realized patient volumes which are below the equilibrium which would prevail if
there were fewer Level 3 facilities in the market. Furthermore, I do not consider the benefits
of consolidating facilities across counties: Travis County (including Austin) is bordered by
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seven less populous counties - transferring patients from, e.g., Williamson and Hays counties
to Travis county hospitals would both reduce the number of patients in those counties being
seen at low volume facilities and further increase the volume at the designated Travis County
NICU.
Overall, besides the current project there are useful examples of service regionalization
in medical care in other parts of the world which can serve as an instructive example for efforts
within the United States. While US regulators face a different set of challenges involving
determining how to weigh factors such as price not present in countries with national health
insurance systems, there is reason to believe that regulators here possess a set of tools which
would enable them to take advantage of the positive effects of patient volume while still
protecting consumers from monopoly behavior. The savings in lives in Texas alone are on
the order of $1,000,000,000 per year.
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Chapter 3
NICU Investment and Aggregate Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
The effects of investment in neonatal intensive care on outcomes for infants needing
this service have been studied in a wide variety of papers, including [13], [8], [28], [65], [66],
[88], [89], among others. The rate of admission to NICUs has been rising [?]. This rise is
unlikely to be driven by increased need for the service: over the period 2007-2012 studied in
[?], the average patient admitted to the NICU became larger and less likely to be premature.
Most infants who are admitted to the NICU are admitted due to being premature or low
birth weight. Admission rates are more likely driven by an increase in the available beds
and the desire of hospitals to fill the beds.
Existing work, including [88] and others documents that there are important rela-
tionships between the volume of procedures performed in the NICU and the quality of the
outcome, generally assessed via the mortality rate for admitted patients. Existing work
makes it clear that infants are better off being served in hospitals which see higher volumes
of patients, all else equal. This suggests, however, that entry into the intensive care market is
potentially a cause for concern. In the current paper, I assess the effects of entry of intensive
care units on a variety of outcomes, using data at the county level for every county in the
US.
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Hospitals make these investments since they know that NICU services are attractive
to patients. In related work, I show in [15] that patients place a high valuation on intensive
care services, whether they are likely to need them or not. Across different Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) categories, patients value the presence of a NICU. This includes patients whose
infants are in the least severe group at birth, who are both the most numerous and the least
likely to need NICU services. Patients care substantially more about the presence of a NICU
than they care about their own driving distance to the hospital, which is typically one of the
more important inputs to the patient’s choice.
Hospitals react rationally to the fact that patients value a service. In a two hospital
market, if Hospital A has a NICU and Hospital B does not, the fact that Hospital A will
perceive that it is losing patients to Hospital B as a result of not having a NICU will make
the investment very attractive. The costs of investing are not so high that the cost of doing
so is prohibitive. The costs of investment which I found in [15] are well within the ability
of most hospitals to make. The value of doing so to Hospital B is clear: more patients who
would otherwise have gone to Hospital A will now instead choose to go to Hospital B. This
generates revenue to B from two sets of patients: patients who do not need NICU services
and patients who do need NICU services. Previously Hospital B would have transferred such
patients to A. Having invested in a NICU, B no longer needs to transfer patients and may
instead treat them in-house, capturing the lost revenue from providing those services.
However, the incentives of hospitals to invest are problematic from the point of view
of aggregate social welfare. If every hospital in a market invests in neonatal intensive care,
average patient volumes per NICU will fall, since the number of patients who ‘need’ the
service is to a first approximation fixed (the number of low birth weight patients is roughly
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constant from year to year - values are reported for Texas in [16]). As average volumes fall
and quality decreases, the average mortality rate in the whole market increases. This is an
important cost to free entry in this market which has not been adequately addressed by
policymakers.
An existing literature on “supplier induced demand” suggests that hospitals may
also take more aggressive steps to fill beds, once they exist. In the context of the previous
example, once Hospital B builds its NICU, it will likely discover means to fill the available
beds. This is likely to include admitting patients who are more marginal to the treatment.
That will involve admitting patients to the NICU who are born at higher birth weights, an
effect noted by [?]. Another way to generate more patients to the NICU is to increase the
rate at which Cesarean sections are performed in the hospital. Those infants are admitted
to the NICU at a higher rate. Patients who are more marginal to needing a Cesarean section
are likely to find that doctors are more interested in performing one when their hospital has
a NICU.
The best tool available to prevent excessive entry into this market is Certificate of
Need regulation. In many states, entry by hospitals into new markets (and entry of com-
pletely new hospital facilities) is regulated by a state board. These state boards are required
to approve any investment by any hospital. While there many be important negatives as-
sociated with the existence of Certificate of Need regulation, including the fact that these
boards may be subject to regulatory capture, or the fact that preventing entry into the NICU
market (or any other market) gives the incumbent an important measure of market power,
it is an important question whether the potential negatives associated with entry outweigh
the positives.
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In this paper, I will look at the effects of entry by NICUs on a variety of outcomes,
including total mortality among very-low birth weight infants and the mortality rate among
the same, total mortality and mortality rates among low birth weight infants, the number of
Cesarean sections and the Cesarean section rate (as a fraction of all births) and the effects on
total mortality among infants and total mortality rates. I will examine how these outcomes
change as a function of both entry by NICUs, exit by NICUs and the total number of NICUs
in the market. I will consider the role for regulation in improving outcomes in this market.
3.2 Related Literature
There is a large literature on the topic of volume and quality of outcome in NICUs.
The topic of outcomes for low and very-low birth weight infants also attracts a substantial
amount of attention, due to the tremendous importance of this population in determining
the total number of infants who die prior to one year of age in the US every year. Generally
about 1.5% of all infants born every year are very-low birth weight, but this group makes
up more than half of the total number of infants who die every year ([16]). Some trends in
this population are tracked in [66].
There are at least two potential channels for harm via NICU entry, both of which have
been considered in different papers. First of all, there is a role for the volume of procedures
in generating higher quality outcomes. Given that effect, which is studied in several papers
including [88], [89] and [13], entry may have negative effects by reducing patients volumes
within the NICU. A separate channel for negative effects involves a role for NICU levels. In
particular, the diffusion of lower-level (in a sense to be defined later) NICUs in a market
means that some women end up receiving treatment in hospitals which are not fully equipped
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to provide care to them. The importance of this channel is the subject of some debate: for
several approaches to the topic see [8], []freedman2012 or [88]. The level channel is also
discussed in [28].
A regulator wishing to concentrate patient volumes and take advantage of volume
effects would create a “regionalization” plan. Such arrangements exist beyond neonatal
intensive care and generally call for designating particular hospitals to be the highest-level
provider of a particular service. Other hospitals may provide lower levels of the same service
and must have in place arrangements to transfer patients to the highest level provider when
that is necessary. For discussion of this in the context of neonatal intensive care, see [65].
There is similarly an enormous literature in the medical services research area on
volume effects and the quality of outcomes across a wide range of different areas of medical
care. Generally, though not always, the result found is that higher volumes lead to better
quality outcomes, where “better quality” can be measured in terms of mortality rates, rates
of complications, lower costs, etc. For a survey of some of this literature, see [83].
Inferring the direction of causality in this case can be quite difficult. For a survey of
the complexities involved in doing so, see [69]. The complication is principally that we would
expect that unobservably sicker patients who be sent to unobservably better hospitals. This
makes both volume and the average mortality risk of the patients endogenous to an unob-
served hospital quality parameter. Inferring causal effects is quite difficult. For an attempt
at doing so using instrumental variables techniques in the context of neonatal intensive care
in Texas, see my related work [16]. For more examples of this work in economics with similar
approaches to instrumenting for patient volume, see [54], [45] or [44].
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To my knowledge there is not previous existing work on the effect of entry by NICUs
on the rate of Cesarean sections within the market. [?] is a recent paper which considers
the effect of a policy change in Texas which ended reimbursement under the state Medicaid
program for early elective C. sections. She found that the change in reimbursement policy
did reduce C. sections among the Medicaid population (the group at which the policy change
was directed), but found evidence of increases in the rate of C. sections among the privately
insured populations, suggesting that doctors may be targeting an annual income (C. sections
reimburse at higher rates than conventional deliveries among both privately and publicly
insured patients). This relates to the literature on physician-induced demand for services,
including [?].
On the regulatory side, there is a parallel between proposals in the health services
research context to regionalize patient care and an earlier literature on the regulation of
natural monopolies. A long literature on the regulation of such monopolies points to the
sub-additivity of the cost function as the crucial feature (see the surveys in [?] and [?]); the
key feature in this market is super-additivity in the production of quality.
3.3 Industry Background
Neonatal intensive care services are provided to severely ill infants. The most common
reason for admission to the NICU is low birth weight. NICUs are differentiated by levels,
ordered by the sophistication of the service they provide. For the purposes of this paper,
there are three levels: I, II and III.1 Level I NICUs are standard labor and delivery wards
1Some classification schemes feature a fourth, higher level, but those units are extremely few in number
and are not tracked separately in the data which I use.
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handling uncomplicated deliveries, all of which have the ability to stabilize an infant who is
low birth weight or unwell for some reason for transport to a higher level facility. Level II
units provide more intense care than Level I units, but do not perform surgeries and are not
able to provide indefinite mechanical ventilation. Level III units provide the highest-possible
level of care: surgery, mechanical ventilation of unlimited duration, etc.
The technology of neonatal intensive care emerged in the latter half of the 20th
century. The history of the NICU is recounted ably in [11], from which much of the account
which follows is taken. Prior to that, infants who were born at low or very low birth weight
were discharged home to their parents after birth. Nothing could be done for them medically,
so they nearly inevitably died. Starting in the early 20th century, doctors in France and then
in the United States discovered that incubating infants born at abnormally low weights made
it possible to save a fraction of them. Infants born at low birth weights generally do not
produce enough heat on their own to survive, so placing them in incubators enables many
of them to survive until they reach a weight sufficiently high that they produce this heat on
their own.
The medical profession was initially skeptical of the idea of placing infants in incu-
bators, or of placing incubators in hospitals ([11]). The first “intensive care units” were for
that reason not in hospitals. Some were in amusement park sideshows or at traveling fairs,
where attendees could pay nominal sums to see “tiny infants”. The infants themselves were
cared for free of charge in these units. One of the first “units” of this type which existed on
a more permanent basis was an attraction in Coney Island. For a fascinating account of this
period in the history of the technology, see [84] or [90].
Investment by hospitals in this market is popular since, as noted above, patients
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place a high valuation on the service, whether they anticipate needing it or not. Hospitals
accurately perceive this and, in markets where their investment is not restricted, have tended
to enter the NICU market. CON restrictions, however, are effective at preventing entry where
they exist. In Figure (3.1) I plot a count of the number of Level III NICUs in Texas, Georgia
and Florida between 1992 and 2014. Georgia and Florida both have strict certificate of
need control, while Texas does not. As is immediately visible in the figure, the number of
NICUs has increased dramatically in Texas over the time period pictured while the number
in Georgia and Florida has stayed flat. Georgia and Florida also regionalize care for these
infants.
3.4 Data
I use two principal sources of data for this project. I use the American Hospital
Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals to track investment in NICUs over time. I use the
National Center for Health Statistics’ Linked Birth Cohort files to track births, deaths and
birth weights.
The AHA annual survey is a comprehensive survey of the nearly the entire universe of
American hospitals. Each facility is surveyed every year and unique identifiers are assigned
to each facility. This permits hospitals to be tracked across years. The period of the survey
I use covers 2005 - 2010, which is the same period covered by the data from the National
Center for Health Statistics. The survey asks both whether hospitals report having neonatal
intermediate or intensive care units (corresponding to the Levels II and III definitions offered
above, respectively) or whether they offer non-zero numbers of beds providing intensive or
intermediate care. Nearly every hospital reports having non-zero beds at either level if and
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Figure 3.1: NICU Entry in Texas, Georgia and Florida, 1992 - 2013
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only if it reports having the corresponding unit, but if the value of the unit indicator is
missing in any year I assume the units were present if the number of beds offered is reported
to be non-zero. The Annual Survey also includes the state and county in which each facility
is located. This permits me to count the number of Level II and Level III units at each
hospital in the data for the whole period I study. When numbers change from year to year,
I infer that entry or exit have occurred.
Data from the National Center for Health Statistics covers nearly all infants born in
the United States each year. Each record is derived from birth certificate data reported by
the states. All states report the data and most states report 100% of all infants born in
a given year. Birth certificate data is matched by the NCHS with death certificate data,
where it is again possible in nearly every state to match 100% of the records from the year.
Records include a wide range of information about the mother, father and the infant. For
the purposes of the current project, relevant information includes the birth weight of the
child (in grams), whether the child died, and how the baby was delivered (i.e., vaginally or
via Cesarean section). The version of the data I use also includes information about the
state and county of birth. This permits me to count the number of infants who are low or
very low birth weight at the level of a county for each year between 2005 and 2010.
For each county in the country, I create a panel over the six years 2005 - 2010. In
each year, I compute the total number of infants born at low and very low birth weight ( <
2500 and 1500 grams, respectively) and compute the mortality rate within each group. For
the two groups, I compute mortality rates taking as the denominator the set of all births in
that county or just the set of LBW and VLBW infants. I also compute the overall mortality
among all groups (i.e., including those who are not low birth weight). Finally, I compute
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the count of Cesarean sections and the rate at which they are performed. I see how these
outcomes vary as a function of the number of units at Levels II and III, plus entry or exit
by the same.
3.5 VLBW Mortality
This section covers mortality among the very low birth weight, including the following
Tables:
• Table 3.1 Entry of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
• Table 3.2 Entry of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
• Table 3.3 Total Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
• Table 3.4 Total Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
• Table 3.5 Exit of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
• Table 3.6 Exit of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
Effects on the mortality of very low birth weight infants due to entry of Level II or
Level III facilities suggest that there is not a strong effect on mortality in the specifications
used here. Controlling for state and year fixed effects suggest that entry of a Level II or Level
III facility increases mortality in this population, as can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, but
after controlling for a county specific term the effect mostly vanishes. This may be because
there is little variation in entry in the time period studied and not very much variation in
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Entry 3 38.8481∗∗∗ 35.7390∗∗∗ -0.3183
1.2110 1.1941 0.2265
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.1: Entry of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Entry 2 33.3243∗∗∗ 30.3766∗∗∗ 0.0429
1.2170 1.1975 0.2203
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.2: Entry of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
the number of very-low birth weight infants at the level of each county, so the number of
deaths is likely to be small.
Effects on the mortality of VLBW infants from the total numbers of facilities in Tables
(3.3) and( 3.4) at Levels II and III paint a similar picture. While there is limited support for
the claim that the total number of Level II and Level III units lead to more deaths among
very-low birth weight infants the effects are hard to see when controlling for fixed effects at
the level of a county.
Exit of either a Level II or a Level III unit from the markets studied here shown in
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Total 3 14.3707∗∗∗ 14.4835∗∗∗ 0.0936
0.0756 0.0769 0.1443
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.3: Total Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Total 2 20.3036∗∗∗ 20.7659∗∗∗ 0.6531∗∗∗
0.1728 0.1749 0.1438
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.4: Total Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
Tables (3.5) and (3.6) show only modest effects on mortality, though the effects run in the
opposite direction to that predicted by the theory that there are important learning-by-doing
effects at work. One important caveat in this is that it is impossible in any of the data to
observe when during the year an exit occurs - the timing of the exit is likely to be important
when there is an important role for forgetting, as was documented in [16]. The total number
of exits is also likely to be low, given that these units do not frequently close.
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Exit 3 44.0341∗∗∗ 40.3784∗∗∗ 1.2619∗∗∗
1.3061 1.2924 0.2457
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.5: Exit of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort. VLBW Mort.
Exit 2 37.8466∗∗∗ 35.2810∗∗∗ 0.2763
1.2542 1.2324 0.2309
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.6: Exit of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality
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3.5.1 VLBW Mortality Rates among All Births
The current section considers the effects of entry, exit and the total number of facilities
at Levels II and III on the mortality rate of very-low birth weight infants, where the rate is
computed against the total population of all infants born in the county every year. This rate
has the advantage of being more stable than the rate computed in the subsequent section.
The issue is that the number of very low birth weight infants in any given market is likely to
be low in a given year, so that the rate computed will vary quite a bit with a single additional
death in the category. In this section, by computing very low birth weight mortality against
all of the patients, the problem of instability is avoided, though now the problem is to an
extent reversed: the rate compute can be insufficiently responsive to the number of deaths.
This section includes the following Tables:
• Table 3.7 Entry of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.8 Entry of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.9 Total Level 3 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.10 Total Level 2 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.11 Exit of Level 3 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.12 Exit of Level 2 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
The effects are not significant over most of the specifications and outcomes measured
here in Tables (Table 3.7) - (Table 3.12) . There is not very much evidence for a strong effect
in this area. The standard errors tend to include zero across the various specifications. As
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Entry 3 -2.3248 -2.1640 -0.1454
2.7237 2.7446 2.9103
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.7: Entry of Level 3 On VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Entry 2 -2.4840 -2.3688 0.0658
2.7112 2.7285 2.8303
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.8: Entry of Level 2 on VLBW mortality rate per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Total 3 -0.3568 -0.2126 0.1481
0.3131 0.3252 1.8535
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: Total Level 3 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Total 2 -0.8107 -0.7092 -0.1054
0.5314 0.5556 1.8490
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.10: Total Level 2 on VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Exit 3 -2.2320 -1.7878 -0.0836
2.9485 2.9789 3.1594
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.11: Entry of Level 3 On VLBW Mortality Rate Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Exit 2 -2.7169 -2.4897 -0.2596
2.8094 2.8252 2.9668
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.12: Entry of Level 2 on VLBW mortality rate per Thousand Births
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mentioned above, this is in part due to the fact that the very-low birth weight population is
about 1.5% of all births (nationally), and then the subset of infants who die in this group is
much smaller. The effect being examined in these regressions is quite small in the best case
because the denominator (all births) is so much larger than the numerator (deaths among
a subset of 1.5% of the denominator). It is not terribly surprising that it is hard to see any
effect.
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3.5.2 VLBW Mortality Rates Among VLBW Births
This section covers mortality rates among very-low birth weight infants only, including
the following Tables:
• Table 3.17 Entry of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
• Table 3.18 Entry of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
• Table 3.15 Total Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
• Table 3.16 Total Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
• Table 3.17 Exit of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
• Table 3.18 Exit of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
The effects of entry, exit and the total number of facilities at Levels II and III are
outlined in Tables (3.17) - (3.18). Here I have limited to looking at the mortality rate of very
low birth weight infants among the total population of very low birth weight infants, rather
than the total number of births every year. Here the results are more suggestive of a positive
effect of entry, where both entry in Table (3.17) and the total number of Level III units
in Table ( 3.15) are associated with lower mortality rates among the very low birth weight
group. In most county markets, however, the total number of very low birth weight infants
every year is going to be low, so the rates will be unstable due to a “small denominator”
problem: with three total very low birth weight infants in a given county market, the rate
will be very sensitive to a single additional death.
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Entry 3 -88.1778∗∗∗ -77.1822∗∗∗ -7.4510
17.4677 17.5246 17.9334
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.13: Effect of Level 3 Entry on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Entry 2 -62.0273∗∗∗ -54.5079∗∗ 1.4509
17.4487 17.4425 17.5260
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.14: Effect of Level 2 Entry on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Total 3 -21.1686∗∗∗ -20.6812∗∗∗ -4.3977
2.0185 2.0888 11.3966
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.15: Effect of Total 3 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
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(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Total 2 -27.4827∗∗∗ -26.0075∗∗∗ -6.6002
3.4520 3.5833 11.3981
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.16: Effect of Total 2 on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Exit 3 -69.3765∗∗∗ -61.9221∗∗ 16.3818
19.0254 19.1402 19.5815
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.17: Effect of Level 3 Exit on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
(1) (2) (3)
VLBW MR VLBW MR VLBW MR
Exit 2 -65.7772∗∗∗ -56.7633∗∗ 5.0067
18.2346 18.2374 18.5014
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.18: Effect of Level 2 Exit on Mortality Rate Among VLBW
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3.6 LBW Mortality
This section considers mortality rates among low birth weight infants (< 2500 grams),
a category which includes the very-low birth weight infants above (those weighing less than
1500 grams). This section includes the following Tables:
• Table 3.23 Entry of Level 3 on LBW Mortality
• Table 3.24 Entry of Level 2 on LBW Mortality
• Table 3.21 Total Level 3 on LBW Mortality
• Table 3.22 Total Level 2 on LBW Mortality
• Table 3.23 Exit of Level 3 on LBW Mortality
• Table 3.24 Exit of Level 2 on LBW Mortality
Entry of facilities at Levels II and III shows similar effects on mortality as those
seen in the mortality of VLBW infants. In Tables (3.23) and (3.24) the effects are positive
in two specifications, though not when including controls for each specific county. This is
compatible with the idea that volumes decrease, skill depreciates, and additional patients
die due to lower patient volumes.
In the cases of total numbers of Level II and Level III facilities described in Tables
(3.21) and (3.22) we find similar support for this theory. Higher numbers of each facility are
associated with higher mortality rates, though these effects are no longer present once we
control for fixed effects at the county level, where there is little variation left in the data at
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Entry 3 49.0003∗∗∗ 45.1010∗∗∗ -0.6112∗
1.5125 1.4922 0.2525
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.19: Entry Level 3 on LBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Entry 2 41.6122∗∗∗ 37.9721∗∗∗ -0.2078
1.5211 1.4975 0.2456
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.20: Entry Level 2 on LBW Mortality
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Total 3 18.1937∗∗∗ 18.3470∗∗∗ 0.2840
0.0912 0.0929 0.1608
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.21: Total 3 on LBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Total 2 25.4366∗∗∗ 26.0629∗∗∗ 0.6716∗∗∗
0.2154 0.2179 0.1603
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.22: Total 2 on LBW Mortality
such a small geographic unit. But there is suggestive evidence that some of the effects may
be present.
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Exit 3 55.2185∗∗∗ 50.6135∗∗∗ 1.3773∗∗∗
1.6320 1.6158 0.2738
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.23: Exit Level 3 on LBW Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
LBW Mort. LBW Mort. LBW Mort.
Exit 2 47.9651∗∗∗ 44.7827∗∗∗ 0.4704
1.5660 1.5396 0.2574
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13667 13667 13667
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.24: Exit Level 2 on LBW Mortality
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3.6.1 LBW Mortality Rate among All Births
The following section discusses the mortality rate among low birth weight infants
against the total population of all births. As before, there is the caveat that these rates are
likely to be “too stable”: insufficiently responsive to a few additional deaths, in contrast to
the previous section where rates are unstable. This section concerns the following Tables:
• Table 3.29 Entry of Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.30 Entry of Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.27 Total Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.28 Total Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.29 Exit of Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
• Table 3.30 Exit of Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
The effects sizes here are mostly estimated to be right around 0. Confidence intervals
include zeros across most of the specifications and outcomes considered. This is likely in part
because the rates are quite stable, given that the percentage of infants who are low birth
weight is relatively low (generally less than 10% annually) and the number of deaths among
this population is also quite low, so the effect size we are searching for is a small change in
a subset of a subset of the much larger population of all births in the market.
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Entry 3 -2.7589 -2.4936 -0.1221
3.0068 3.0277 3.1828
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.25: Entry of Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Entry 2 -3.0452 -2.8319 -0.0087
2.9929 3.0100 3.0952
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.26: Entry of Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Total 3 -0.4284 -0.2518 0.1602
0.3456 0.3587 2.0270
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.27: Total Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Total 2 -0.9770 -0.8448 -0.1312
0.5866 0.6129 2.0221
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.28: Total Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Exit 3 -2.6408 -1.9883 -0.0540
3.2549 3.2862 3.4552
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.29: Exit of Level 3 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Exit 2 -3.1556 -2.7629 -0.2221
3.1014 3.1166 3.2445
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.30: Exit of Level 2 on Mortality Rate of LBW Per Thousand Births
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3.6.2 LBW Mortality Rate Among LBW Births
This section considers the effects of entry, exit and the total numbers of facilities at
Levels II and III on the mortality rate among the low birth weight only. These measurements
will likely suffer from a similar problem as those in the similar section for very low birth
weight infants above, though the problem is alleviated somewhat because the low birth
weight group is a larger percentage of the total number of infants born every year, generally
somewhere around 10%. While there will be some instability in the computed rates here,
rates are more stable than those computed for the very-low birth weight infants. This section
includes the following Tables:
• Table 3.35 Entry of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
• Table 3.36 Entry of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
• Table 3.33 Total Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
• Table 3.34 Total Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
• Table 3.35 Exit of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
• Table 3.36 Exit of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
Here the measured effect sizes for specifications including controls only for the year
and state suggest a positive effect from additional entry of Level II or III facilities. Entry has
a negative effect on the mortality rate among this group. However, this effect vanishes when
controls for the county are included. The signs may be negative but the standard errors are
wide and comfortably include 0.
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Entry 3 -138.7689∗∗∗ -124.0044∗∗∗ -13.6939
23.6416 23.7731 24.9643
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.31: Effect of Entry of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Entry 2 -115.9300∗∗∗ -104.1384∗∗∗ -18.0991
23.6124 23.6594 24.3964
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.32: Effect of Entry of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Total 3 -35.4795∗∗∗ -34.1961∗∗∗ -6.9902
2.7239 2.8269 15.8648
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.33: Effect of Total Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
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(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Total 2 -46.9516∗∗∗ -44.0454∗∗∗ -12.8614
4.6643 4.8547 15.8665
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.34: Effect of Total Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Exit 3 -112.0474∗∗∗ -100.5398∗∗∗ 14.2475
25.7550 25.9699 27.2596
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.35: Effect of Exit of Level 3 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
(1) (2) (3)
LBW MR LBW MR LBW MR
Exit 2 -104.7596∗∗∗ -93.8885∗∗∗ 6.3231
24.6853 24.7447 25.7553
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 8468 8468 8468
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.36: Effect of Exit of Level 2 on Mortality Rate Among LBW
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3.7 Number of Cesarean Sections
This section considers the effects of entry, exit and the total numbers of facilities at
Levels II and III on the number of Cesarean sections which are performed in the market.
The Tables discussed in this section are the following:
• Table 3.41 Entry of Level 3 on C-Sections
• Table 3.42 Entry of Level 2 on C-Sections
• Table 3.39 Total Level 3 on C-Sections
• Table 3.40 Total Level 2 on C-Sections
• Table 3.41 Exit of Level 3 on C-Sections
• Table 3.42 Exit of Level 2 on C-Sections
The effects of entry on the number of C. sections in Tables (3.41) and (3.42) suggest
different things depending on the precise specification, since the sign of the main effect
changes. It is not possible on the basis of these results to form a clear conclusion about
the way C. section totals are affected by the entry of an additional facility at either level.
The effects of the total number of facilities on the outcome in Tables (3.39) and (3.40) are
more consistent with the story, in that both suggest increases in the number of C. sections
as facility counts increase. It may be that there is an issue here from not knowing the exact
timing of entry during the year in making the conclusion that additional facilities increase
C. section numbers.
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(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Entry 3 3393.6825∗∗∗ 3042.9344∗∗∗ -1.3293
106.0003 103.1548 6.6090
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.37: Entry of Level 3 on C-Sections
(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Entry 2 2802.8565∗∗∗ 2475.1023∗∗∗ -15.4585∗
106.7386 103.6288 6.4256
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.38: Entry of Level 2 on C-sections
(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Total 3 1350.2811∗∗∗ 1341.3620∗∗∗ 70.3634∗∗∗
5.1128 5.1701 4.1561
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.39: Total Level 3 on C-Sections
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(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Total 2 1711.6750∗∗∗ 1722.5540∗∗∗ 51.5792∗∗∗
15.6637 15.6844 4.1704
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.40: Total Level 2 on C-Sections
(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Exit 3 3736.4798∗∗∗ 3298.6132∗∗∗ 2.4295
114.5982 111.9683 7.1746
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.41: Exit of Level 3 on C-Sections
(1) (2) (3)
C. Sect. C. Sect. C. Sect.
Exit 2 3288.3675∗∗∗ 3013.9848∗∗∗ -2.7543
109.8176 106.4363 6.7372
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.42: Exit of Level 2 on C-sections
149
3.7.1 C-Section Rates
In the current section, we consider the effects of entry, exit and the total number of
facilities at each of Levels II and III on the rate at which C. sections are performed in the
market. The computation of this rate should not be subject to the instability or excessive
stability problems seen when similar comparisons were made of the outcomes for low and
very-low birth weight infants above, since the number of women getting C. sections annually
is very much larger than the fraction of infants who are LBW or less. The Tables discussed
in this section are:
• Table 3.47 Entry of Level 3 on CSection Rate
• Table 3.48 Entry of Level 2 on CSection Rate
• Table 3.45 Total Level 3 on CSection Rate
• Table 3.46 Total Level 2 on CSection Rate
• Table 3.47 Exit of Level 3 on CSection Rate
• Table 3.48 Exit of Level 2 on CSection Rate
In the preferred specification which controls for time trends and state and county
fixed effects, there is no clear effect of any of the outcomes on the C. section rate. There
are effects in other specifications only controlling for state and year effects, suggesting that
entry does increase the rate at which these are performed, but trying to see this effect in
aggregate data at the county level is challenging.
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(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Entry 3 67.6135∗∗∗ 61.6915∗∗∗ 0.3462
8.0751 7.9763 3.9370
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.43: Effect of Level 3 Entry on CSection Rate
(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Entry 2 68.2473∗∗∗ 57.3694∗∗∗ 0.3188
8.0373 7.9318 3.8287
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.44: Effect of Level 2 Entry on CSection Rate
(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Total 3 15.9777∗∗∗ 14.9948∗∗∗ 1.8786
0.9206 0.9384 2.5072
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.45: Effect of Total Level 3 on CSection Rate
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(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Total 2 29.6970∗∗∗ 25.7336∗∗∗ 2.1259
1.5590 1.6033 2.5011
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.46: Effect of Total Level 2 on CSection Rate
(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Exit 3 67.0976∗∗∗ 59.7321∗∗∗ 0.3667
8.7450 8.6610 4.2740
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.47: Effect of Level 3 Exit on CSection Rate
(1) (2) (3)
CS Rate CS Rate CS Rate
Exit 2 67.7317∗∗∗ 59.0016∗∗∗ 0.2112
8.3305 8.2131 4.0134
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.48: Effect of Level 2 Exit on CSection Rate
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3.8 Overall Mortality Rate
Finally, I consider the effects of entry, exit and the overall numbers of Levels II and
III on the overall mortality rate. This section includes the following Tables:
• Table 3.53 Entry of Level 3 on Total Mortality Rate
• Table 3.54 Entry of Level 2 on Total Mortality Rate
• Table 3.51 Total Level 3 on Total Mortality Rate
• Table 3.52 Total Level 2 on Total Mortality Rate
• Table 3.53 Exit of Level 3 on Total Mortality Rate
• Table 3.54 Exit of Level 2 on Total Mortality Rate
The effects in these Tables are not significant, except for a single specification in
Table (3.51). The mortality rate may not vary that much from year to year within a given
county, so the effect may be hard to see (or, indeed, absent). It is not clear that there is an
important effect of any of these events on the measured outcomes. It is likely that in large
counties with many births and deaths every year, the effect of entry of a single hospital, for
example, will be on the order of several additional deaths a year at most, while the effects
in small counties may be difficult to infer because the total number of deaths is in any case
quite small. But it is not possible to claim with confidence that there is any effect on the
overall mortality rate.
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(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Entry 3 -4.3406 -3.8712 -0.2616
3.4956 3.5187 3.6861
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.49: Effect of Level 3 Entry on Total Mortality Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Entry 2 -4.5162 -3.9025 -0.0848
3.4795 3.4981 3.5847
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.50: Effect of Level 2 Entry on Total Mortality Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Total 3 -0.7379 -0.4485 0.3218
0.4018 0.4169 2.3475
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.51: Effect of Total Level 3 on Total Mortality Rate
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(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Total 2 -1.5451∗ -1.2862 -0.1897
0.6820 0.7123 2.3418
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.52: Effect of Total Level 2 on Total Mortality Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Exit 3 -4.2817 -3.4095 -0.2894
3.7841 3.8191 4.0015
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.53: Effect of Level 3 Exit on Total Mortality Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Total MR Total MR Total MR
Exit 2 -4.8488 -4.2183 -0.5277
3.6056 3.6220 3.7576
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No
County FE No No Yes
N 13666 13666 13666
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.54: Effect of Level 2 Entry on Total Mortality Rate
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3.9 Policy Options
Given the evidence that there are potential negative effects from permitting free entry
into the neonatal intensive care market, it is important to formulate an appropriate policy
response. The most important tool available to regulators is “Certificate of Need” regulation.
As noted above in connection to the discussion of Figure (3.1), where these programs exist
it is clear that regulators can successfully prevent entry into the market.
The existence of an economy of scale in the production of quality suggests that entry
restrictions may be warranted. The key question is whether the costs to consumers in the
form of higher prices for NICU services are outweighed by the benefits to the same in the
form of a lower mortality rate. The second of the two calculations is relatively easy to make:
in [16] I estimate the magnitude of the externality that is imposed by additional entry by
showing how patient mortality is affected by hospital volume within the NICU. Prices are
generally not observed in this environment, whether the transacted prices actually paid by
insurers to hospitals or the copayments of the patients to the hospitals. This presents a
problem. In [15] I measure what can reasonably be viewed as a proxy for prices in order
to get some measure of the market power that firms may gain by becoming the monopoly
provider of NICU services in their markets. I find that firm pricing power likely increases in
the worst case scenario (for consumers) by a factor of 2 - 2.5 at worst. This is not so large
that firms can completely appropriate all of the surplus generated by lower mortality rates.
On the other hand, there are other tools at the disposal of the regulator here. In
particular, a regulator can decide to directly regulate prices. Here there is a parallel to an
earlier literature on the regulation of natural monopolies. In that case, the cost function of
the natural monopolist is sub-additive (see [?]), so it satisfies
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C(y) <
n∑
i=1
C(yi), y =
n∑
i=1
yi
That is, the cost of having one firm produce the total output y is lower than the cost
of having n firms produce the same total quantity. In that case, it may make sense to have
one firm produce the whole output rather than permitting n firms to enter the market from
the point of view of social efficiency. The present market is formally similar in that average
quality is higher when one firm produces all of the output, rather than n firms.
With that in mind, the regulator may wish to restrict entry into the market. However,
the same regulator can potentially prevent some of the welfare loss associated with monopoly
power by regulating prices directly. Even if the regulator does not attempt to ensure prices
approach marginal cost (which is a difficult benchmark to achieve, especially under incom-
plete information), it is still likely possible to reduce the harm caused by monopoly pricing
by mandating some price lower than the (observable) monopoly prices. Prices themselves
are directly observable and regulable, whereas quality can only be produced with a crucial
input with inelastic supply: more patients.
In my paper [16] I show that caring for patients in fewer NICUs in Texas could lead
to a billion dollar welfare improvement annually in the form of lives saved. There may be
similar savings to be realized in other large states. The savings over the entire country will
likely be in the range of several billion dollars. This represents quite a substantial gain from
restricting entry into this market.
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3.10 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered the aggregate welfare implications of hospital invest-
ment in Neonatal Intensive Care across a variety of outcomes. Motivated by the observations
that there are both important volume effects on producing high quality outcomes within a
hospital and that there are strong incentives for hospitals to make an investment in this
service, given that it is both attractive to patients an in itself lucrative, I study the fact that
there may be “too much” entry into this service market. Across a wide range of outcomes, I
found some suggestive evidence that there may be effects of entry on some of the outcomes,
but overall the results are not clear enough to make the conclusion unambiguous. In future
work, I propose to add more years to the data.
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Appendix 1
Investment Appendix
1.1 NICU Capacity Constraints
Using birth certificate data with information about the hospital of birth, I can com-
pute several measures of utilized capacity in NICU’s. These measures show that capacity
is not a binding constraint in almost any hospital in the state. Capacity constraints at the
market level are not leading to the construction of new NICU’s. It is possible using ag-
gregate birth and NICU admission information at the level of entire counties to compute a
measure of utilized days among all hospitals in the county, which is in Table (1.1). Total
NICU admits at birth and total beds available are calculated from birth certificate data from
the National Center for Health Statistics and the Annual Survey of Hospitals, respectively
([104]). I compute the number of bed-days available per year in each market and use birth
certificate data to count the number of infants admitted to the NICU at birth in the same
markets. I can then compute the number of bed-days available per admitted patient.
Average duration of stay per patient is not computable from any data I have since
I do not observe dates of admission or discharge, but estimates exist in the literature. The
National Perinatal Information Center reports that the average duration of stay in the NICU
across all patients in the 2009-2010 year was 13.2 days ([74]). As is immediately visible in
table (1.1), bed-days available per admit in every metro area far exceed this limit.
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The birth certificate data enables me to count the number of patients admitted each
month at each hospital in the data. This exercise provides a similar picture. I make three
comparisons. First, I compare the total number of admissions of any duration to the NICU
for the whole month to the number of beds. The results are in Table (1.5) in the second
column. Only a third of hospital-month observations see more patients admitted to the
NICU for the whole month than there are beds in the facility. Given the average duration
of stay, it is very unlikely that a capacity constraint is reached in these months.
Second, I compute two related measures of capacity utilization. I suppose that each
patient admitted to the NICU (or transferred in) stays for the either the average stay of 13.2
days, or double the average duration (26.4 days). I subtract this from the total number of
bed-days available in the month and then divide by the number of beds available. This is
a “free days per bed” measure. Columns 3 and 5 in Table (1.5) report mean free days per
bed assuming 13.2 and 26.4 days per stay, respectively, while columns 4 and 6 report median
free days per bed under the same assumptions. Even under the much more unrealistic, 26.4
days assumption, mean free days per bed are still positive, averaging about 4.25 for the eight
years of the data. Assuming all stays are of average duration leaves on average 16.6 days
per bed free for the same period.
These measure suggest that intensive care units are very unlikely to be capacity
constrained in almost any month. Hospital investment is not being driven by capacity
constraints at existing facilities in the market.
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1.2 Computational Details
The number of distinct aggregate states of competitors across three different distance
bins is given by the product of binomial coefficients
(
n0−5 + 4− 1
n0−5
)(
n5−15 + 4− 1
n5−15
)(
n15−25 + 4− 1
n15−25
)
where nx−y is the number of firms at distances between x and y miles. This is the
number of different ways to allocate nx−y firms to each of 4 categories (three levels and an exit
state) where the number in any category is permitted to be 0.1 I then take the product across
the three distance bins. From the perspective of one of these competitors, in each of these
aggregate states the firm itself can be at level 1, 2, 3 or out of the market. In the small two-
competitor example above, the number of state elements would be:
(
0+4−1
0
)(
2+4−1
2
)(
0+4−1
0
)
=
10× 4 = 40.
For example, consider Knapp Medical Center in Weslaco, Texas (a one-hospital town
of about 40,000 people near the Mexican border), which is located between Brownsville
and McAllen (each of which is 4-5 times larger and has several hospitals). Knapp Medical
Center has no competitors with 0-5 miles, one competitor within 5-15 miles (in McAllen) and
6 additional competitors within 15 - 25 miles (in both McAllen and Brownsville). There are
47 = 16384 configurations of all facilities, tracking the identities of all hospitals individually,
but only
(
0+4−1
0
)(
1+4−1
1
)(
6+4−1
6
)
= 336 different configurations of the state when firms are
treated as symmetric, multiplied by 4, for 3 possible levels and an exit state.
1See the “Stars and Bars” combinatoric article on Wikipedia or [40]
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I ignore all competitors in Mexico, which is without serious consequence, since few
(if any) US citizens will cross the border to give birth in Mexico. The reverse is also true:
the fraction of patients in Mexico who cross the border to give birth in US hospitals is quite
small as a fraction of the total. In principle, it would be useful to know where they live
in Mexico (their distances from hospitals in the US), how long it takes to cross the border
(which is highly variable, even conditional on an hour of the day and season of the year,
somewhat unpredictable, and measured in hours, not minutes), whether they cross by foot
or driving, and how they value the neonatal intensive care services in US hospitals vs. their
Mexican competitors. But the fraction of such patients is small in all hospitals along the
border, with the possible exception of a single hospital in El Paso where in some years about
one third of all births in this single hospital are to women with addresses in Mexico.
What makes the computation costly in terms of time is updating individual utility
for each consumer for each of these firms. That is, I suppose that all consumers are aware of
the level of each firm at the time when they make their decisions, so firms can expect that
investments or divestments will change. When the aggregate state changes (i.e., when any
firm is at a different level), then the deterministic component of utility must be updated for
every consumer in the marketplace. Thus, the expected utility of going to each hospital must
be updated at each location (zip code) which has that hospital as an option. Depending on
the distances and levels, the number of aggregate states will generally be fewer than the
number of configurations of levels in each possible facility.
For these markets, the value of only one state is updated each iteration. A single mar-
ket configuration is chosen for an update randomly, where the probabilities are set according
to the values computed for those states at earlier iterations of the algorithm. The values
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of all potential configurations are enumerated and initialized to some positive number, and
then the transition to the next state is randomized, with probabilities weighted according to
the values assigned to each state. The important trade-off is to assign those initial weights
high enough to encourage exploration of the state space, but not so large that convergence
never occurs. This method is well-described in both [86] and [29].
To judge convergence, I follow [29] and [41]. Convergence is measured at a subset of
the states visited in the last million steps of the algorithm. The convergence test approxi-
mates the continuation value at each state visited in the last million iterations by drawing K
possible continuation locations from each state reached. This is the most computationally-
intensive part of the approximation procedure, since for each of M states visited, K draws
need to be made to compute the estimated continuation value. The cost of this computation
increases rapidly in the number of states visited recently. For that reason, following [29] I
only check convergence every million iterations or so.
The very largest markets, for example hospitals located in Houston or located be-
tween Dallas and Fort Worth have around 30 other facilities within 25 miles. The full
market-configuration space in this case has about 430 = 260 ≈ 1e18 elements. The size
of the state space for the firm with the largest number of competitors among all firms is(
9+4−1
9
)(
11+4−1
11
)(
13+4−1
13
) × 4 ≈ 180, 000, 000. The cost of updating deterministic utilities for
state spaces this large to compute demand are currently prohibitive. For that reason, I am
not currently able to compute the solution to the dynamic program for a subset of firms.
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